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8CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
The U.S. aerospace industry has experienced many changes in the past twenty years,
including cuts by the Federal government in the budget for the Department of Defense after the
end of the cold war. Global competition has increased on the commercial business side. These
changes have led aerospace companies to reshape their business mindset, thus improving
profitability and business efficiency. And many aerospace companies have begun to introduce
so-called "lean" practices, which can be defined as a specific culture and business philosophy,
not a business tool. Some companies have accomplished their lean practices by merging or
acquiring other companies in order to gain a competitive advantage.
The process referred to as lean has proven to be a superior approach to improving
operational efficiency in the aerospace industry. This phenomenon has occurred partly as a result
of pressure on the commercial manufacturers from the U.S. Air Force as well as from other
companies. In response, several companies have studied lean practices and subsequently changed
their manufacturing systems to a lean production system. Companies that started lean have
succeeded in reducing production cycle times and inventories, and have introduced statistical
quality management systems. However, those companies, as well as others, are still in the
process of becoming lean.
There have been many mergers and acquisitions in the aerospace industry. According to a
semi-annual review by the trade journal Defense Mergers and Acquisitions, nearly $60 billion
worth of deals were announced or completed in the first half of 1999, while the total value of
defense mergers in 1992 was about $2.5 billion, and $6 billion in 1993. The top three U.S.
defense contractors-Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon, which together accounted for
25% of all defense contracts in 1998-have all evolved as the result of major mergers (Hellman,
1999).
These two major changes-mergers and acquisitions and lean production-have wrought
significant change in the aerospace industry. However, few studies have been done about the
relationship between mergers and acquisitions and lean production. For this thesis, I researched
the impact of a lean production transition which took place between two companies who merged
and then I reviewed several merger/acquisition cases involving companies with different lean
maturities.
I selected Boeing as the primary subject of my research for two reasons. First, Boeing
actively deploys lean production, including a lean vision of the aerospace industry, and it has
studied lean deployment based on its experience. Second, Boeing merged or acquired different
companies who were at different levels of lean, including the largest merger experience in the
industry with McDonnell Douglas. Then, to obtain added supporting data about mergers and
9acquisitions from other companies who represent a different level of lean maturity, I also
researched the mergers and acquisitions of Vought Aircraft and United Technologies
Corporation (UTC).
1.2 OBJECTIVE
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the effects of mergers and acquisitions on a
company's lean enterprise efforts, and thus be in a position to recommend a better way to
accomplish the transition to lean during and after a merger/acquisition between companies with
different lean maturities.
There are several key questions to be considered:
* What changes have occurred after mergers and acquisitions, in terms of lean effort?
" What are the barriers and solutions to the lean transition after mergers and acquisitions?
" Did the rate of lean effort of a company change after mergers and acquisitions?
To answer these questions, I conducted interviews of Boeing employees who were involved in
the lean production process and with mergers and acquisitions, choosing interviewees who
represented various levels in the company structure. I structured the interviews specifically to
gather data about two Boeing mergers: one with McDonnell Douglas and the other with Hughes
Space and Communications. These cases are quite different in that both companies were at
different levels of lean maturity at the time they merged with or were acquired by Boeing.
Then, in order to better understand the merger/acquisition process when it involves
companies at different stages of lean, I interviewed people from Vought Aircraft and from UTC.
Vought Aircraft acquired Aerostructure Company in 2000; UTC acquired Sundstrand in 1999.
I categorized the interviews in the following way: the effect of mergers and acquisitions
on the lean efforts between-
" a merger of two companies that had a medium level of lean but different levels of lean
expertise;
" the acquisition of a company that had a mature level of lean with a company that seemed
less successful prior to the merger/acquisition;
" the acquisition of a company that had a medium-low level of lean with a company that
had no experience with lean (absorption);
* the acquisition of a company that had a low level of lean with a company that had no
experience in lean (limited integration)
These case studies helped me determine whether differences in lean expertise and lean
maturity would affect the lean transition during and after the merger/acquisition; what changes,
barriers, solutions, and lessons could be identified in each situation; and what general lessons
were available for exemplifying a successful lean transition in a merger or acquisition.
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1.3 RESEARCH METHODS
I used two research methods: literature research and personal interviews with employees
of aerospace companies.
In the literature research presented in chapter 2, I gathered publicly available information
about the aerospace industry, lean enterprises, mergers and acquisitions, and Boeing itself. This
chapter focuses on:
* industry dynamics in the aerospace industry over the past twenty years
" lean enterprise or lean concepts in the aerospace industry
" mergers and acquisitions as an integration process in the context of lean efforts.
From the literature research, I began to understand why lean deployment and mergers and
acquisitions occurred in the aerospace industry, what lean practices have been used and
developed, the nature of the organizational and cultural changes that occur during and after
mergers and acquisitions, and the areas that should be carefully considered prior to a merger or
acquisition between two companies with different levels of lean expertise and maturity.
In chapter 3, I analyze Boeing's lean efforts and its mergers and acquisitions based on
public information. I sought reasons for mergers and acquisitions in terms of organization,
business portfolio, and lean enterprise effort. I also gathered brief background information about
the mergers and acquisitions engaged in by Vought Aircraft and UTC.
In chapter 4, I provide detailed information about the interviews, as well as the interview
questions and the analysis method used to support the interview results.
The results are provided in chapter 5, where I give feedback from my interviews with
Boeing employees and those in other companies who were directly or indirectly involved with
lean enterprise efforts and mergers/acquisitions with other companies. The chapter includes:
* Case 1: Boeing's merger with McDonnell Douglas
* Case 2: Boeing's acquisition of Hughes Space and Communications
* Case 3: Vought Aircraft's acquisition of Aerostructure Corporation
* Case 4: UTC's acquisition of Sundstrand
* an additional case study of Boeing's lean transition with its suppliers
From the interviews, I gathered data about all the cases, focusing specifically on the
changes, barriers, solutions, and lessons learned relevant to lean efforts during and after mergers
and acquisitions.
In chapter 6, I developed models of a lean transition for each case study and then discuss
general principles for a successful lean transition during the merger or acquisition. In Boeing's
mergers and acquisitions, I tried to confirm whether the mergers and acquisitions accelerated the
I1
company's efforts to transition to a lean enterprise, based on qualitative data from the interviews
and quantitative data from the financial information available in Boeing's annual reports.
In chapter 7, I offer conclusions arising from my research, make suggestions for future
work, and recommend a roadmap for the success of post-merger lean processes.
The thesis structure is illustrated in the Figure 1.1.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 TWENTY YEARS OF CHANGE IN THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, and the end of cold war, the
American aerospace industry entered an era of dramatic restructuring and downsizing (Murman,
2002), which triggered deep cuts in defense spending. Figure 2.1 illustrates the cuts in defense
spending for R&D.
DoD R&D Spending as a Percent of Total US R&D
30%
25%
20%
15% ,f I r 1 ., 7 .
M
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Year
Source: National Science Foundation.
Figure 2.1 Department of Defense R&D spending
The cuts in defense spending triggered the integration of commercial and defense
technologies in the aerospace industry in general (Ciardello, 2000). That meant that the
Department of Defense (DOD) began to place greater emphasis on technologies that could be
used in both the commercial and defense industries. It led to consolidation of competition among
the top eight defense suppliers. The DSB Report on Antitrust of Defense Industry Consolidation
(April 1994) noted that "budget reductions have led to vast overcapacity in the defense industry
that can only be eliminated through downsizing and competition."
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A sluggish global economy in the early 1990s caused problems for civil aviation as well.
Many airlines canceled their orders, and competitions were expected to be severe, impelling a
number international joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, layoffs, and restructuring.
In addition to competition, high development costs as a result of increasingly complex
products led American aerospace manufacturers to enter into work arrangements with foreign
companies. This was different from the past in that while earlier arrangements included co-
production and licensing agreements, the new trend covered joint ventures and collaborative
arrangements in the design, production, and marketing of aerospace products and systems. In the
end, internationalization expanded far beyond the original practice of subcontracting. Given
rising production expenses, American firms willingly broadened their horizons to include risk-
sharing with foreign manufacturers of structural subassemblies.
Financial markets have always been important stakeholders, but their impact on the
aerospace industry as grown as well. In this context, pressures for lower costs and improved
return on capital were being required by the financial markets, again impelling the dramatic
restructuring and mergers and acquisitions that began to occur in the aerospace industry.
In the end, U.S. aerospace companies embarked on mergers and acquisitions, and they
began to introduce the entire concept of "lean' with the aim of reducing costs and increasing
profitability. Figure 2.2 is an exploratory cause-and-effect diagram that shows the dynamics of
the U.S. aerospace industry. As you can see from the diagram, various factors in the industry led
in mergers and acquisitions and lean deployment. Figure 2.3 shows the mergers and acquisitions
of aerospace companies in the U.S. As you can see from this diagram, there has been significant
consolidation in this industry.
Lean
Global Perspective
Risk
Cost Pressure
HihDevelo
Cost
Product Mind
Increasing Impacts of Cuts in Defense
Financial Market Spending
End of Cold War Co
Legacy
Bad Economy
Decrease in Sales
Mergers and
Acquisitions
Restructuring in the
Business Portfolio
Sharing
pment
set Challenge of
Complexity
mpetition
Source: author
Figure 2.2 Aerospace Industry Dynamics in the Past Twenty Years
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Source: The Economist, 7/18/02
Figure 2.3 Mergers and Acquisitions in Aerospace Industry
2.2 THE LEAN ENTERPRISE
2.2.1 The Concept
The Lean Aerospace Initiative at MIT, which created the concept of a lean enterprise,
defined it as follows:
"A lean enterprise is an integrated entity which efficiently creates value for its multiple
stakeholders by employing lean principles and practices."
-Lean Aerospace Initiative, MIT, 2001
The following description of a lean enterprise appears in the Boeing 2001 Annual Report,
describing the concept of lean enterprise that Boeing pursues:
Our entire enterprise will be a Lean Operation, characterized by the efficient use of assets,
high inventory turns, excellent supplier management, short cycle times, high quality and
low transaction costs.
- 2001 annual report of Boeing
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Consodation in Ameica's defence sector
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"Lean Enterprise Value" describes the generic enterprise process architecture of a lean
enterprise as shown in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4 Generic Enterprise Process Architecture
The life cycle process shown in the figure includes the traditional functional aspects of a
business related to product or program execution. These are the value stream activities that
contribute directly to revenue generation for the enterprise through the creation of products,
systems, or services delivered to the enterprise customers.
Enabling Infrastructure Processes includes many traditional corporate support functions.
In a lean enterprise, they are reoriented to support the Life cycle Processes. This can involve a
major transformation in the operation of most support functions.
The final set, Enterprise Leadership Processes, does not show up on traditional
organizational charts, but these processes play a critical role in setting the direction for an
enterprise that wishes to transform to lean.
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In this thesis, mergers and acquisitions that take place between companies with different
levels of lean maturity are discussed in the context of enterprise integration as described by
"Enterprise Leadership Processes."
2.2.2 Characteristics of Lean
One of the key characteristics of lean is a culture of continuous improvement rather than
a business tool for cutting costs, which is one of the main reasons why lean is so hard to deploy.
The MIT Lean Aerospace Initiative describes the following as characteristics of lean (Murman,
2002):
1. Lean is customer-focused. "Customer focus" means that enterprise activities are pulled by
customer needs and expectations. Implementing a Just-In-Time policy is an example of pull-
based production. Through mergers and acquisitions, companies have more suppliers and
more customers. A Just-In-Time policy that meets customer requirements on time requires
companies to integrate or reduce their supplier base and the number of common parts in
products during the integration process.
2. Lean is knowledge-driven. Lean maximizes productivity by drawing upon knowledge and
innovations from everyone, including workers and suppliers, thus contributing to perfect
quality. The involvement of different stakeholders in knowledge sharing requires trust-based
relationships that include mutual commitment and obligation, both internal and external, with
suppliers. In a merger or acquisition, the transfer of lean practices or knowledge will occur
between companies that are at different stages of lean maturity or lean expertise. Therefore,
in a merger or acquisition of lean companies, it is very important for one company to manage
the transition of lean efficiently to the other company.
3. Lean eliminates waste. Lean identifies defects, over-production, transportation, movement,
waiting, inventory, and over processing as wastes. Eliminating waste not only improves
productivity but also increases flexibility and responsiveness to changing demands. In
mergers and acquisitions, duplicated resources, such as materials, information, and people,
are found during the process of integration. These resources can be minimized or efficiently
managed with the lean principles for reducing wastes.
4. Lean creates value. It puts a premium on the growing pie, not just reducing cost, to benefit
all stakeholders. Mergers and acquisitions can create value to stakeholders by reducing costs
through supplier integration and by increasing sales through customer-base expansion.
5. Lean is dynamic and continuous. It pursues ongoing systemic as well as incremental
improvement, both innovations and continuous improvement. Continuous improvements are
accomplished through work standardization, productive maintenance, root-cause analysis,
and worker training and empowerment. The post-merger or acquisition process requires
continuous improvements it involves integration of two companies' cultures and vision.
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2.2.3 Life-Cycle Processes
The term 'Lean' originally referred to the lean manufacturing system utilized by Toyota,
generally called the Toyota Production System (TPS). As lean thinking was applied to different
areas of an enterprise, the concepts of lean engineering and lean supply-chain management also
emerged. These three lean areas employ the same basic concepts and principles of lean thinking,
but the goals and attributes are different. In this section, I focus on the difference in lean
applications to each area.
2.2.3.1 Lean Manufacturing and Lean Engineering
The goal of lean manufacturing is to provide customized or diverse products to customers
at the right time and with perfect quality. Thus the key issue in lean manufacturing is cost control.
Using Just-In-Time, waste can be eliminated and production rate raised even with different
customer requirements. Jidoka enables the company to remove defects and improve the quality
of its products. Standardized work, leveled and balanced production, and kaizen contribute to the
implementation of Just-In-Time and Jidoka, and a creative and engaged workforce supports this
contribution (Shields, 2003). Figure 2.5 shows the attributes of lean manufacturing.
TPS
Cost control through the
efirmination of waste
Right Qty Perflci
Right Mix Quality
T Right Time K
A
Standardized Leveled & Balanced Kaizen
Work Production
Engaged and Creative Workiorce
Figure 2.5 Toyota Production System
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In a merger or acquisition, an organization with lean manufacturing expertise should
share its lean expertise with the merged or acquired company which typically has different lean
expertise. Therefore, the most synergies are obtained when the expertise of each company is
exchanged between the two companies.
Lean engineering and lean manufacturing are part of the basic characteristics of lean, but
the focus of each is somewhat different. Lean engineering has different goals from lean
manufacturing, that is, engineering is the activity of product development, while manufacturing
is the activity of producing products. The goals of lean engineering are to streamline the
production development process and improve the product development cycle time. Lean
engineering focuses on making sequential processes flow seamlessly and manages iterations to
avoid unplanned rework. Thus, while the waste found in lean manufacturing generally covers
materials, the waste found in lean engineering is related primarily to information (Nightingale,
9/03). Table 2.1 shows the difference between waste in lean engineering and lean manufacturing,
and Table 2.2 shows the difference of focus between lean engineering and lean manufacturing.
Table 2.1 Waste in Lean Engineering and Lean Manufact ring
Waste Lean Manufacturing Lean Engineering
Creation of unnecessary data and
Over-production Producing more or sooner than information; information over-
required dissemination; pushing, not pulling,
data
Lack of control; too much in
Inventory Accumulations of materials beyond information; complicated retrieval;
JIT requirements outdated, obsolete information
Information incompatibility;
Excessive movement of material, tools software incompatibility;
Transportation or parts communications failure; security
issues
Unnecessary Any human movement that does not Lack of direct access; reformatting
Movement add value
Waiting Time in which no value is added Late delivery of information;
WaitingTimeinwhih ____va __e__saddeddelivery too early (leads to rework)
Any item that does not meet Haste; lack of reviews, tests,
Defective Products specifications verifications; need for information or
knowledge, data delivered
Effort expended that does not add Unnecessary serial production;
Processing customer value excessive/custom formatting; too
many iterations
Source: Lean Aerospace Initiative
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Table 2.2 Differences of Focus between Lean Manufacturing and Lean Engineering
Lean Manufacturing Lean Engineering
Define Value Visible at each step Harder to see, emergent goals
Identify Value Stream Parts and Material Information and Knowledge
Make Process Flow Iterations are waste Iterations often beneficial
Customer Pull Driven by Takt Time Driven by needs of enterprise
Perfection Process repeatable without errors Process enables innovation and
cuts cycle time
Source: Lean Aerospace Initiatives
In an organization that has strength in lean engineering, engineering units have strong
cultures. Thus, the diffusion of lean engineering to other organizations during mergers and
acquisitions is not a simple exchange. Instead, the transition of lean overlaps with the transition
of the strong engineering culture.
For efficient control of product and process development in lean engineering, Integrated
Product and Process Development (IPPD) is critical in lean engineering. IPPD is a management
technique that simultaneously integrates all essential acquisition activities through the use of
multidisciplinary teams to optimize the design, manufacturing, and supportability of processes.
2.2.3.2 Lean Supply Chain Management
Lean supply chain management represents a new way of thinking about supplier
networks. The lean principles in lean supply chain management require cooperative supplier
relationships while at the same time balancing cooperation and competition. Cooperation
involves a spectrum of collaborative relationships, coordination mechanisms and supplier
partnerships, and strategic alliances are a key feature.
Lean supply chain management is a hybrid approach to organizing inter-firm
relationships, representing a blend of "Arm's Length" and "Vertical Integration" (Nightingale,
10/03). Arm's length is defined as the way in which firms buy highly standardized inputs from
outside specialized suppliers. This method lowers production costs but requires higher
coordination costs. Vertical integration is the way in which firms produce required inputs in-
house. It is quite customized, involves high transaction costs or dedicated investments, and
requires close coordination. Usually companies use vertical integration for specialties and arm's
length for commodities. Table 2.3 shows the strengths and weakness of each approach.
21
Table 2.3 Vertical Integration versus Arm's Length
Strengths Weakness Products
Vertical - Technology development - Loss of economies of - Specialties that
Integration - Better coordination of scale requires specific
complex tasks - High cost and capital quality and
- Less coordination and expenditure requirements
communication costs
Arm's Length Economies of scale and high High coordination Cost Commodities that
productivity Less of technology is sensitive to price
development
Mergers and acquisitions can change the structure of supply chain management. When
two companies with vertically integrated suppliers and suppliers at arm's length integrate, there
may be opportunities to reduce the number of suppliers or achieve economies of scales with each
type of supplier. Meanwhile, the ratio of vertical integration to arm's length can change or a third
supply network, such as virtual integration, can emerge.
The advancement of information technology reduced coordination costs, making vertical
integration less attractive. Increasing customization of demand and complexity of product made
arm's length less desirable. So a mix of the two approaches emerged as a form of lean supply
chain management. In this case, firm buys both customized and standardized inputs, and
partnerships and strategic alliances are required for collaborative advantage (Piepenbrock, 2003).
This can be gained through synchronized production and delivery. In order to achieve this, a
company should share its lean principles with the supplier network.
Meanwhile, a transition of lean principles from the customer company to the suppliers
occurs. The customer company should manage integrated supplier lead times and delivery
schedules, and make customer demand pull supplier flows. The customer company and suppliers
should try to minimize inventory throughout all tiers of the supply chain, thereby ensuring on-
time supplier delivery to the point of use. A good quality management system can minimize
incoming inspections and encourage companies to strive for zero quality defects. However, these
applications are only available with an IT infrastructure that enables effective two-way
communications about coordinating production and delivery schedules. Table 2.4 shows the lean
principles and actions of the lean supply chain management.
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Table 2.4 Lean Principles and Actions in Supply Chain Management
Lean Principles Actions
Design Supplier Network Design of supplier network driven by strategic thrust
Architecture N Fewer suppliers: Clustered control
* Supplier selection based on performance
D Ensured process capability certificationDevelop complementary supplier Targeted suppler development
c Greater responsibilities delegated to suppliers
* Linked business processes
Create flow and pull throughout * IT infrastructure
supplier network * Two-way information change and visibility
_ Synchronized production and delivery (JIT)
* Joint problem-solving
Establish cooperative * Mutual assistance
relationships and effective * Partnerships and strategic alliances
coordination mechanisms * Open and timely communications
* Increased interdependence and shared destiny
M Seamless information flowMaximize flexibility and
responsiveness 0 Flexible contracting
* Rapid response capability
* Integrate suppliers early into design and IPTs
Optimize product development * Collaborative design: Architectural Innovation
through early supplier integration 0 Open Communications and information sharing
* Target costing: design to cost
Integrate knowledge and foster 0 Knowledge sharing: technology transfer
innovation * Aligned technology roadmaps
IT infrastructure plays an important role in designing and managing a supplier network.
Figure 2.6 shows the role of IT infrastructure in integrating different stakeholders of supplier
networks and in removing barriers among stakeholders.
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Figure 2.6 Evolution of Supplier Network through IT Infrastructure .
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In mergers and acquisitions, an ideal model of "Emerging Lean" seems hard to produce
in a short period because companies have different policies of supply management-prescriptive
or collaborative-and because differences of lean maturities between suppliers and the prime
company cause barriers to the synchronization of production information.
Figure 2.7 shows differences between traditional supplier networks and virtual supplier
networks based on IT infrastructure and partnerships. Virtual integration means that suppliers
working in the partnership supply specialties by participating in the product development process
and sharing production information through the Internet. This not only decreases production
costs and product development risks, but also raises operating efficiency as a result of
achievement of Just-In-Time implementation.
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Figure 2.7 Virtual Integration
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 shows how effective the virtual integration is. Toyota, the leader of
lean, bases half of its suppliers on the partner suppliers. Partnership based companies shows
higher ROA than the companies based on vertical integration and arm's length.
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Figure 2.8 Effectiveness of Partnership Relations with Suppliers
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Figure 2.9 Comparison of Supplier Networks Between Boeing and Toyota
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2.2.3.3 Relationships between Lean Manufacturing, Engineering, and
Supply Chain Management
When there is waste in lean manufacturing, the elimination of waste is integrally related
to suppliers. For example, over-production and wait time in the production process can be
resolved by synchronizing production with deliveries by suppliers and orders from customers.
Parts inventories can be decreased by a supplier's timely provision of parts to the company, and
defects can be minimized by a quality control system for suppliers.
This effort can be applied to the lean engineering. Integrated product and process
development requires suppliers of specified parts to participate in the design process to increase
customer satisfaction, decrease development cycle time, and increase manufacturing efficiency.
Therefore, when two lean companies with different lean expertise merge-e.g. one
company with lean manufacturing and the other with lean engineering-management of the
supply chain is one area in common where lean manufacturing and lean engineering can save
costs. It can also provide excellent opportunities for the companies to begin collaborations that
lead to an exchange of different perspectives.
2.2.4 Enabling Infrastructure
The enabling infrastructure links different functions, such as IT, finance, human
resources, and facilities. In this section, I will discuss the IT infrastructure, because IT is an
important enabler of communications and information sharing with different stakeholders.
When different organizations are integrated, they must consider the integration in terms
of organization, processes, technology, and information. Information integration, or the
integration of IT infrastructure, is key to enabling the integration of the organization, processes,
and technology because IT infrastructure controls the information flow among different
stakeholders. It prescribes how information will flow into different functions and tasks.
For example, in technology integration, the IT infrastructure enables a global integrated
product development team to share the same data and information with developers in different
areas, making the development process faster and more efficient. Also, the IT infrastructure can
be a kind of knowledge database which can be applied to different areas in an enterprise. For
example, Boeing manages its own web pages to communicate its lean vision to employees and to
share best practices. E-business solutions, such as an e-commerce system, a customer relations
management system, and a supply chain management system, connect the company with
customers and suppliers and synchronize production information between suppliers and the
company, thereby eliminating information waste.
From this standpoint, IT infrastructure is crucial to a company's lean capability. The IT
integration strategy, such as one IT system or separate IT systems, should be carefully selected
based on the lean maturity of different functions of the company.
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2.2.5 Enterprise Leadership Process
Enterprise leadership is an intangible infrastructure that makes life cycle process and
enabling infrastructure work. Leadership contributes to cultural change, knowledge transfer and
generation, and enterprise integration, based on shared vision and efficient communication.
This section discusses the leadership process in the context of mergers and acquisitions, that is,
enterprise integration and cross-cultural diffusion of lean thinking
2.2.5.1 Enterprise Integration in Mergers and Acquisitions
Many companies expect a merger or acquisition to provide the scale of operations,
resources and capabilities, financial strength, and broad market reach necessary for growth and
long-run competitiveness. Specifically, in large mergers and acquisitions, companies engage in a
merger and acquisition that is intended to strengthen their competitive position by building new
capabilities or adding new resources to existing businesses (Schmidt, 2001).
Companies in the aerospace industry merged or acquired other companies for similar
reasons. To overcome cost pressures, companies integrated common suppliers, R&D, and
manufacturing facilities. To avoid business risk from cyclical trends among commercial and
defense businesses, companies expanded their business portfolio by acquiring other companies
that had cutting-edge technologies in a different business area.
Schmidt, in his book, Making Mergers Work, describes the integration philosophy and
integration processes.
Integration Philosophy
Along a continuum of philosophies for integrating acquired or merged corporate entities,
four methods are widely used today, as illustrated in Figure 2.10. The integration philosophies
apply not only to the integration of people and organizations but also to the integration of IT
systems after the merger/acquisition.
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Figure 2.10 Integration Philosophy
a. Limited Integration
This method involves creating a place for the acquired corporation within the acquiring
company's structure. The acquiring company views the acquisition as an addition to its existing
business portfolio. Consequently, the acquired company usually retains its management team and
operational and administrative practices, and employees and their work environment are virtually
unaffected. This embodies a "light touch" integration philosophy characteristic of holding
companies and highly diversified businesses.
United Technology Company's (UTC) acquisition of Sundstrand is a kind of limited
integration. UTC is a holding company that owns different companies in various industries,
including Pratt & Whitney, OTIS, Carrier, and others. Sundstrand was acquired by UTC and
became one of the subsidiary companies of UTC.
In limited integration, the subsidiaries companies are on an equal level, and if the holding
company does not have a lean leadership, there may be a problem in introducing and integrating
one company's culture and vision into the acquired company during the lean transition.
27
28
b. Dominant Company
In this approach, the new entity is absorbed or becomes completely subordinate to the
acquiring company. Absorption means the acquired company conforms to the management
system, organizational structure, business processes, and operating philosophy of the acquiring
company. Absorption is often preferred in intra-industry mergers and acquisitions, which are
largely motivated by cost savings, where competing companies are consolidated into a single,
larger organization.
In Dominant Company integration, the acquiring company takes the leadership during the
integration process. The important thing during the lean transition is that the acquiring company
knows the strengths and weaknesses of the acquired company, in order to motivate employees in
the acquired company during the integration process.
Boeing's acquisition of Hughes Space and Communications, and Vought Aircraft's
acquisition of Aerostructure Corporation are good examples of the Dominant Company
philosophy. In both cases, the acquiring company integrated the target company in terms of
technology, people, structure, and manufacturing facilities.
c. Mutual Best of Both
In this approach, the two companies set out with a fresh view of how to manage, organize,
and operate the new entity. This task is accomplished systematically via thorough and objective
examination of the approaches used by both companies-their structures, systems, processes,
cultures, and technologies. The purpose is to select the best practices from each company and
incorporate them into a blueprint for the new entity. Boeing's merger with McDonnell Douglas
exemplifies this philosophy.
During the lean transition in the integration process, both companies should understand
the differences in both companies and what areas can be shared. Then they can establish a new
culture, new vision, and standardized lean principles that apply to the new entity.
d. Transformation to a New Company
Transformation extends beyond the mutual best of both by reviewing-and sometimes
incorporating-selected features from the business models or processes of other prominent and
highly regarded companies. Mergers and acquisitions that are designed to incorporate leading-
edge technologies and world-class sales or other functional capabilities tend to follow this track.
2.2.5.2 Integration Process after Merger or Acquisition
To determine what factors should be considered for a lean transition in the post-merger
process, it is important to see the process of merger and acquisition.
The post-merger process of merger and/or acquisition comprises the following two
stages: (1) due diligence, and (2) integration planning and implementation.
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Due Diligence
During Due Diligence stage, which takes place largely after an offer to merge or acquire
has been made, companies must ensure that the proposed deal is sound from strategic, economic,
and implementation perspectives. This stage includes the following issues (Schmidt, 2001):
* verify strategic expectations
" validate the price
" confirm leadership commitment
* discover significant liabilities and exposures
* confirm legal ability to combine
" verify the expected organizational capabilities
" analyze people issues such as retention, cost, and cultural fit
" evaluate IT position
" understand variations among company units and jurisdictions.
There are few references or information about lean transitions in mergers and acquisitions
at the due diligence stage. However, one important factor in for successful mergers at the due
diligence stage with different operating expertise is that cultural differences and leadership
commitment should be fully considered in this stage, for the reason that motivations for sharing
knowledge with and identifying and obtaining best practice from different companies in the
integration process are deeply affected by the culture and leadership style of each company.
Integration Planning and Implementation
In the Integration Planning stage, successful acquirers or merger partners create a
comprehensive plan for all aspects of integrating their businesses and organizations. In the
Implementation stage, acquiring or merging partners execute the merger integration plan for the
new enterprise, and measure and report the progress.
In Figure 2.11, the planning for people integration, business integration, and functional
integration is accomplished through the facilitation of a merger integration core team and
resource experts. In this stage, the following jobs are considered (Schmidt, 2001).
* strategic framework or context for the deal
" performance expectations and the actions required to realize them
* project organization, including team structures, composition, and mobilization
* master schedule and key milestones
* approach to decision-making and project coordination
* integration plans for organization and workforces, people systems, culture, work
processes, and technology
* communications and change plans.
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Figure 2.11 Integration Structure
In the mergers and acquisitions cases of lean companies, a process council takes on the
role of merger integration team. Process councils set the common vision, design the architecture
for communications and education systems, and foster a new culture in the new enterprise. It also
standardizes products, processes, technologies, and information management systems and leads
integration within and across enterprise boundaries.
2.2.5.3 Barriers to Integration
Cultural Issues
Cultural issue can be a major obstacle to achieving synergies following a merger or
acquisition. And when lean transition is included in the merger/acquisition, there is an added
layer of cultural transition, which requires that cultural factors be focused in the context of
integration between companies who are undoubtedly at different lean maturity levels. That
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means there is a further overlay of lean initiative. Examples of possible barriers to integration are
(Schmidt, 2001):
* management style
* decision-making process
* degree of customer commitment
* entrepreneurial spirit
* innovation, creativity, and speed to market
* value of teamwork and collaboration
* accessibility of leadership
* performance accountability system
* total rewards philosophy
Political Issues - Power Relationships
Politics within either company can affect integration in two ways. First is the political
relationship between the acquiring company and the target company. If a supplier to the target
company is integrated equally into the acquiring company (and not as a form of vertical
integration), employees in the acquiring company may not be willing to accept the target
company as a partner. When a small company absorbs a larger company, it is not easy for those
in the large company to accept the acquisition.
The second power obstacle is the political relationship between the management and
different stakeholders. Layoffs after a merger/acquisition may not be accepted by the unions on
either side. It is possible that managers will not deal with the changing and uncertain
environment that inevitably accompanies a merger or acquisition. Companies may find that
employees are no longer willing to commit their loyalty to a new venture that their executives
believe is best for the company. And if employees do not buy into the deal in the belief that it
will enhance their careers, their teams, their business units, or the company as a whole, they are
more likely to resist change. High performers who have other possible employment options may
choose to leave if they become too frustrated or anxious about the new company's prospects.
2.2.5.4 Managing the change process
Schmidt (2001) describes the characteristics of a successful implementation as:
commitment and leadership, culture, and connections.
Commitment and Leadership
The extent to which people are dedicated to the new company and are willing to expend
their full energy toward making it a success is the measure of their commitment (Schmidt, 2001).
Employees who are involved in a merger/acquisition find themselves in a changing situation they
did not create. In order to motivate employees in such a dynamic situation, companies should
begin by making their new vision clear to the employees. Common values should be identified
among all levels of employees and stakeholders, and the management of both companies should
speak consistently with all their stakeholders.
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Leadership is another factor motivating employees. Leadership is probably the single
most powerful variable in determining the success of a merger/acquisition (Schmidt, 2001).
Specifically, in the uncertain situations that always occur during the implementation stage of a
merger/acquisition, employees in both companies pay more attention to the action and words of
the leader. Thus, when two organizations merge, the impact of new leadership on the culture will
be great, and therefore must be carefully thought through in advance, right down to the operating
levels. Objectives must be clear ahead of time, and the resulting new management culture must
ultimately motivate both parties to succeed over the long run.
Culture
Creating a new culture, or assimilating people into the established culture of an acquiring
company, is crucial during integration phase. Inspirational leadership, common values, clear
measures, challenging work, and worthwhile rewards provide the impetus and energy needed to
fuel the change process and facilitate a true melding of cultures (Schmidt, 2001). While cultural
messages may be communicated and reinforced through websites, newsletters, and e-mails,
culture is embedded firmly within the company through the actions of its leaders.
Connections and Communication
The primary goals of communication during implementation are to prepare employees for
their new roles, help them accept specific changes and the reasons for them, and enable them to
see how the many different change initiatives fit together during the implementation stage. In
fact, communication often pertains to specific implementation initiatives.
In the longer term, how well communication occurs at all levels is crucial during that
sensitive period when two organizations first join forces. Being frank with information and
clearly sharing the long-term game plan can mean the difference between chaos and acceptance
during the transition to new leadership. During this period, the reason for the merger/acquisition,
the details of integration, and the roadmap and milestones as the integration proceeds, should be
communicated and shared among employees.
The faster people feel connected to their new company and their work unit, the faster they
are likely to fully embrace the goals of integration. One way connections are established is by
keeping employees informed about integration and business-related decisions. Combining high-
tech and high-touch media can help to ensure connections remain interactive and collaborative
and have a human touch.
The most powerful connections are formed when communities of people begin working
toward the goals of the larger organization. This is why successful integrators pay careful
attention to the formation, nurturing, and management of teams. These teams need clear
mandates, explicit goals, empathic leadership, and opportunities to achieve recognizable success
early. These early wins will help to solidify the connections and foster the energy and confidence
needed for future success.
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2.2.5.5 Knowledge Transfer of Lean Thinking
Efficient knowledge transfer or an efficient sharing process often makes use of
knowledge workshops and a knowledge domain.
In a knowledge workshop, people share the same vocabulary and terminology, and
initiate a community of practice where best practices can be shared. The knowledge workshop
can be a formal workshop within the company or an informal workshop such as everyday
conversation and conferences. Internal process councils and a lean office can take the role of a
knowledge workshop where people exchange their best experiences, which often fosters those
practices across the enterprise.
A knowledge domain saves relevant data and information and shares it with other people
in the organization through a variety of media such as the Internet, presentations, and manuals.
IT infrastructure is an important tool as a knowledge domain, linking different stakeholders and
sharing information and knowledge. This process is shown in Figure 2.12.
In this process, the role of communities of practice is important. Communities of practice
are the core group of participants of the workshop and the custodians of the knowledge domain,
where people share and create knowledge and practices to achieve organizational and personal
objectives.
Source: Nightingale, 11/03
Figure 2.12 Knowledge Transfer Process
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2.2.5.6 Cross-Cultural Diffusion of Lean Principles
In the book, Knowledge Driven Work, the authors suggested three strategies for diffusing
lean principles in a cross-cultural context: a piecemeal strategy, an imposed strategy, and a
negotiated strategy.
Piecemeal strategies introduce aspects of change to the parties in smaller, easier-to-
manage pieces. This strategy motivates people by making each part of the change small and
easier to absorb - but it risks inducing a change process that is not systematic. Among the cases
studied, Boeing used a piecemeal strategy during its lean transition implementation at Hughes
Space and Communications.
The imposed strategy involves introducing change initiatives as a whole, with relatively
little opportunity to challenge or adjust the plan. Imposed strategies can be problematic,
especially when two companies involved in a merger or acquisition differ in terms of culture and
the perception of political relationship. The merger between McDonnell Douglas and Boeing and
in UTC's acquisition of Sundstrand both illustrate the problems of imposed strategies during
specific stages of lean transition.
A negotiated strategy stands in contrast to the above two approaches by assuming that
the implementation will involve a give-and-take exchange. Boeing used this approach after its
merger with McDonnell Douglas, and Vought pursued this strategy from the outset.
These three strategies can be also applied to a lean transition between a customer and its
suppliers. It is important to remember that after mergers and acquisitions, the strategy for
implementing lean with suppliers may change. After its merger with McDonnell Douglas,
Boeing's relationship with its suppliers, in terms of lean diffusion, became closer to a partnership,
evolving away from a more rigid relationship.
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2.2.6 Measurements of Leanness
In order to measure the leanness of a company and the rate of lean efforts after a merger/
acquisition, objective measures of leanness, based on public information, are required. Analyzing
leanness by using financial information is one reasonable measure, even if it cannot fully reflect
the lean activity of a company that outsiders do not know.
There have been many discussions about how to determine the effect of lean on corporate
financial statements. Noel Nightingale (N. Nightingale, 2003) recommends several methods for
measuring a company's leanness: (1) profit margin, (2) asset turnover, (3) return on invested
capital, and (4) inventory turnover.
Profit margin measures the fraction of each dollar of sales that trickles down through the
income statement to profits, and reflects both the enterprise's pricing strategy and its ability to
control costs. Profit margin has been the focus of many well-known initiatives in the past, since
its focus is cost. Reducing "cost of goods sold" has always been a focus and remains so under
lean manufacturing, lean supplier chain, TQM, 6 Sigma, and other similar initiatives.
The second measure is asset turnover, which is defined as the ratio of sales to assets. This
measures how productive each dollar invested in assets is working to generate sales.
The third measure is return on invested capital (ROIC), which reflects whether an
enterprise is practicing lean principles. ROIC has strengths in that it quickly reflects an
imbalance within an enterprise when all value positions have not been taken into account. While
the absolute level of ROIC is important, its profile over time is of paramount importance. The
goal is not so much to increase ROIC but rather to maintain its level without deterioration.
The fourth measure is inventory turnover, defined as the ratio of cost of goods sold
(COGS) to inventory. Inventory turnover shows how quickly a company sells the products it
produces, a measure of basic operation efficiency
It should be noted that the measures related to profit and sales have limitation in that they
are greatly affected by the economic environment, such as changes in the economy, rather than
by the operating efficiency inside the company. Thus, they are relevant for finding whether a
company becomes lean over the long term, but they give limited insight into determining
whether a company's leanness has improved after a merger or acquisition.
36
CHAPTER 3
BACKGROUND OF CASE STUDY COMPANIES
In this chapter, I provide background information about Boeing, Vought Aircraft, and
UTC/Pratt & Whitney, each of which will be presented in Chapter 5 as case studies.
3.1 BOEING COMPANY
In this section, I will analyze Boeing Company, with a specific focus on organizational
changes that have occurred as a result of several mergers and acquisitions. I will also discuss the
company's efforts to evolve into a lean enterprise.
In Boeing's 2001 Annual Report, the company described its strategy and vision with
respect to mergers and acquisitions:
"When Boeing acquired Rockwell Aerospace in 1996, it marked the beginning of the
transformation articulated in our vision, from a predominantly commercial airplane
company to the broadest of aerospace companies. The transformation continued with the
merger of McDonnell Douglas into Boeing in 1997, and the acquisitions in 2000 of Hughes
Space and Communications and Jeppensen Sanderson."
As a result of the mergers, Boeing has today expanded its business focus from that of a
commercial airplane company to a business that also includes defense and communications.
3.1.1 Boeing's Mergers and Acquisitions
Over the eight years from 1996 to 2004, Boeing bought or sold 32 companies (see
Appendix A for further details). Among those deals, Rockwell Aerospace (1996), McDonnell
Douglas (1997), and Hughes Space and Communications (2000) rate as the largest deals in the
company's history. Table 3.1 shows the largest mergers and acquisitions since 1996.
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Table 3.1 Summary of Boeing's Mergers and Acquisitions (dollars, millions)
Company Acquired Deal Deal Price/ Deal
or Merged Year Price Boeing Asset Boeing Asset Asset as of 2000
Rockwell 1996 $ 3,055 $ 22,098 13.8% 8.45%$ 2(19954
McDonnell Douglas 1997 $ 15,454 $ 927,254 56.7% 42.8%(1996)
Hughes Space & 2000 $ 3,750 $36,147 10.4% 10.4%
Communications (1999)
Autometric 2000 $ 119 $36,147 0.3% 0.3%$6(1999
Continental Graphics 2000 $ 183 $ 36,147 0.5% 0.5%
_____ _____ ____ ___ _____ _____ 
____(1999) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Jeppesen 2000 $ 1,524 $36,147 4.2% 4.2%
Sources:_Thompson_ Financials website; Boein(1999) gAnnaRep r
Sources: Thompson Financials website; Boeing Annual Reports
3.1.1.1 Acquisition of Rockwell Aerospace
In 1996, Boeing acquired Rockwell Aerospace, including its associated defense business,
by issuing 9.2 million shares of common stock valued at $875 million and by assuming debt
valued at $2,180 million. At the time, the Rockwell aerospace and defense units had annual sales
of $2.5 billion (excluding sales to Boeing), with approximately 21,000 employees. The acquired
business units were merged into the existing Boeing North America unit.
As a result of this acquisition, Boeing expanded its product portfolio in the defense and
space segments with respect to space systems and information/battle management systems.
3.1.1.2 Merger with McDonnell Douglas
Boeing merged with McDonnell Douglas on August 1, 1997. The merged company
operates under the name of The Boeing Company. Combined sales for the new company were
approximately $36 billion in 1996 before consideration of inter-company transactions and
conforming accounting methods. Just prior to the merger, McDonnell Douglas had annual sales
of $14 billion and net income of $780 million, with approximately 63,000 employees. The ratio
of commercial to defense business at McDonnell Douglas before the merger was 75% to 25%
(Boeing Annual Report, 1998).
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the business portfolio and product portfolio for McDonnell
Douglas, prior to the merger.
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Table 3.2 McDonnell Douglas Business Portfolio before Merger
Sales Operating Income
in million % in million %
Military Aircraft $7,952 57% $990 73%
Commercial Aircraft $3,317 24% $101 7%
Missile, Space and Electronic Systems $2,178 16% $194 14%
Financial Services and others $387 3% $74 5%
Total $13,834 100% $1,359 100%
Source: Company Information about McDonnell Douglas in 1996 in Hoover's online
Table 3.3 McDonnell Douglas Product Portfolio before Merger
Source: Company Information about McDonnell Douglas in 1996 in Hoover's online
3.1.1.3 Acquisition of Hughes Space and Communications Business
Boeing acquired Hughes Space and Communications and its related operations for $3.75
billion, in October 2000. As a result of this acquisition, Boeing became one of the leading
providers of satellite and satellite-based services.
The acquired businesses were combined and renamed Boeing Satellite Systems. Today it
is a satellite-based communications company with about 9,000 employees located in Southern
California. Boeing Satellite Systems is included in the company's space and communications
segment
AH-64 Apache (helicopter)
AV-8B Harrier II
C-17 Globe master III
Military Aircraft F-15 EagleF/A- 18 Hornet
MD 500 (helicopter)
MD Explorer (helicopter)
T-45 Training System
Missile, Space, and Delta rockets
Electronics systems Harpoon/Standoff Land Attack Missiles (SLAM)
Mast Mounted Sight (targeting system)
Commercial Aircraft MD-l I tri-jets, MD-80 twin jets, MD-90 series of twinCommercia___Airraft jets, MD-95 series of twin jets
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3.1.1.4 Other Acquisitions
Autometric Inc, a geospatial information technology company, was acquired for $119
million in cash. Autometric is now part of Boeing's space and communications segment.
Continental Graphics Corporation, a provider of technical information to the aviation
industry, was acquired for $183 million in cash.
On October 4, 2000, Boeing acquired Jeppesen Sanderson Inc for $1,524 million in cash.
Jeppesen is a supplier of flight information services and is now included in the commercial
airplanes segment.
3.1.1.5 Effect of Each Merger or Acquisition
It is not easy to determine the effect of each merger or acquisition on the overall business
operations of Boeing because the company has continued to buy and sell companies. However,
most of the other mergers and acquisition-except the deals with the six companies named
above-were so small as to be negligible in measuring their effects on Boeing's financial
statement and operation.
When we compare the asset price Boeing paid for each merger or acquisition, we can
estimate how big each deal was. Based on the data in Table 3.3 presented earlier, the effect of the
merger with McDonnell Douglas is the greatest, compared to other deals, and it can be assumed
that Boeing's financial statement will reflect positively the effect of that merger. The second
greatest effect can be seen in the several acquisitions in 2000.
3.1.2 Changes at Boeing Following the Mergers and Acquisitions
Based on publicly available information, I analyzed changes in Boeing's organization and
in its business portfolio as a result of the mergers and acquisitions.
3.1.2.1 Organizational Changes
After several mergers and acquisitions, Boeing experienced a number of organizational
changes.
After the merger with McDonnell Douglas and the acquisition of Rockwell Aerospace,
Boeing's defense business segment was strengthened and subsequently reorganized. The original
unit named Information, Space and Defense System (ISDS) was split into two pieces and
renamed Military Aircraft and Missile Systems and Space and Communications. These business
units were reorganized again into the Integrated Defense System (IDS) in 2002.
In 2000, Boeing acquired four companies: Hughes Aerospace, Autometric, Jeppesen, and
Continental Graphics. This was done in pursuit of Boeing's intention to transform its business
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from strictly airplane manufacturing to the broader spectrum of aerospace system provider. To
conform to this new vision, new business units were formed: Connexion by Boeing (Boeing's
telecommunications business), Air Traffic Management, and Phantom Works (integrated product
development.
Meanwhile, the workforce within Boeing's Shared Service Group was expanded. Figure
3.1 shows how the organization has changed after the various mergers and acquisitions.
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Figure 3.2 shows how the number of employees has changed as a result of the mergers
and acquisition.
Total Employment
1998 1999 2000
Year
II
2001 2002
Source: Data from Boeing website.
Figure 3.2 Changes in Total Employment since Merger with McDonnell Douglas
As can be seen in Figure 3.3, the total number of employees decreased in spite of
increased revenue after several mergers and acquisitions. This means that revenue per employee
increased after the mergers and acquisitions. Figure 3.4 clearly shows this trend.
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Figure 3.3 Revenue Changes for Different Business Sectors
Figure 3.4 Revenue and Employees before and after Merger with McDonnell Douglas
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3.1.2.2 Business Portfolio Changes
Figure 3.3 also shows how the business portfolio changed after the mergers and
acquisitions. The biggest impact on this change arose as a result of the merger with McDonnell
Douglas. Figure 3.5 shows this change more clearly. Before the merger, Boeing's main business
was commercial aircraft and McDonnell Douglas' main business was in defense. After the
merger, the new Boeing entity developed a business portfolio that was balanced between defense
and commercial business.
Business Portfolio Change (Revenue) before and after merger
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Figure 3.5 Business Portfolio Change in terms of Revenue before and after Merger
Boeing's business portfolio illustrates the ideal strategy for the aerospace industry, based
on the past experience of cyclical ups and downs between the defense and commercial business
in the industry. When defense business is bad, commercial business applied new technologies
from the defense business to products, thus increasing revenues, and vice versa.
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show employment changes in Boeing's commercial airplane business
and its Integrated Defense System since the merger with McDonnell Douglas. The number of
employees was decreasing continually after 1998, due to corporate restructuring and layoffs.
However, Figure 3.8 shows that the number of people in the Shared Service Group increased.
Considering that the role of the Shared Service Group is to set up IT infrastructure, an e-
commerce system, and buy supplies for the company in order to achieve economies of scale, the
increased number of employees in the Shared Service Group means the company is
strengthening its infrastructure after the merger.
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Figure 3.6 Change in number of employees at Boeing Commercial Airplane
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Figure 3.7 Change in number of employees at Integrated Defense Systems
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Figure 3.8 Change in number of employees in the Shared Service Group
3.1.3 Lean Enterprise Efforts at Boeing
3.1.3.1 History
In the mid-1990s, the U.S. Air Force induced the aerospace companies to cut costs
through mergers and acquisitions and to deploy lean enterprise principles. In addition to
Boeing's desire to implement an efficient manufacturing system, this motivated Boeing to learn
more about lean principles with an eye to implementing the program throughout the company.
The 1997 Annual Report notes:
We are using lean-manufacturing techniques throughout the company to reduce
internal costs and improve our production systems. Lean manufacturing relies on the
experts to change their work areas and processes to maximize efficiency, improve
quality and safety, and eliminate unnecessary motion and inventory.
Boeing began by implementing lean manufacturing on the assembly floor. In order to
learn the lean techniques, Boeing sent different levels of managers to acquire the fundamentals
from Japanese companies. The first big lean manufacturing achievement was to change the
Boeing 737 airplane assembly line to a moving production line that incorporated lean
manufacturing. Since implementing the next-generation 737 upper-wing panel moving assembly
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line, employees in this area improved their cycle time by 73% and productivity by 53% (Annual
Report, 1999).
Boeing also applied lean principles to other areas, such as defense aircraft development.
A defense system is different from commercial products in terms of lean applications, in that the
usual goal of a defense system is product development with quality assurance, while the goal of
commercial business is to cut manufacturing costs. So lean efforts in the defense business focus
on the engineering and design side-cutting product and design cycle time and cost. For example,
in the development of the Joint Strike Fighters, the company reduced design times and costs by
30% to 40% and cut production cycle time by 25%. During the upgrade of the Super Hornet, an
integrated team consisting of personnel from Navy, Boeing, and its suppliers applied lean
practices to the design and manufacturing to reduce maintenance and support throughout its
lifecycle.
Lean engineering and design led to a 90% reduction in the number of unique parts and a
95% reduction in the number of welds. These improvements resulted in unifying and reducing
the number of suppliers and focusing instead on the quality of the parts provided by the
suppliers-the start of lean supply chain management. The effects of lean design and supply
chain management on lean manufacturing resulted in increased airplane floor panel fabrication
productivity, reduced manufacturing time and space, 95% reduction in lead time, 68% reduction
in parts cost, 62% reduction in inventory costs, and 50% reduction in floor space.
Boeing described the major process improvements in its 1999, 2000, and 2001 annual
report:
Recent commercial and government developmental programs included early commitment of
resources for integrated product teams, design interface with customer representatives, use of
advanced three- dimensional digital product definition and digital pre-assembly computer
applications and increased use of automated manufacturing processes. Although these
measures have required significant current investments, substantial long-term benefits are
anticipated from reductions in design changes and rework and improved quality of internally
manufactured and supplier parts.
The differences in lean efforts between the defense and commercial sides are described in
Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4 Differences in Lean Efforts for Different Business Sides
Lean Effort Commercial Side Defense Side
The goal Reduction in the manufacturing Reduction in the design cost and
cost mission assurance
Lean Deployment Lean Manufacturing Lean Engineering
Integrated design team
Reducing inventory (JIT) Design for manufacturing
Methods Part number reduction Part number reduction
Production cycle time Advanced design tools
Parts quality management
Common Area Supply Chain management for parts quality and part number reduction
Source: author
3.1.3.2 Lean Enterprise
In its 2001 Annual Report, Boeing announced it would pursue the 'Lean Enterprise' in
the future, and it changed its organizational structure to what is illustrated in Figure 3.9.
Source: Boeing Annual Report, 2001
Figure 3.9 Boeing's Enterprise Architecture
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Boeing's deployment of lean enterprise depends on three key enablers that drive essential
technologies, common systems and processes, information, and changes throughout the company
(Annual Report, 2001).
The first enabler is Boeing Phantom Works, the company's advanced research and
development group, which rapidly propagates and disseminates advanced technologies and cost-
saving processes across the company. This group focuses not only on the application of new
technologies to current and future products, but also on innovative developments and
manufacturing processes for cutting costs. Specifically, integrated product development teams
try to cut design cycle times and cost in half, eliminate the need to build costly prototype
hardware, and produce more efficient, supportable, higher-performance systems with first-time
quality, using 3-D modeling, simulations, and virtual reality tools.
The second enabler is the Shared Services Group. This group allows business units to
focus on profitable growth by providing the infrastructure services required to run their global
operations. The group provides a broad range of services worldwide, including computing and
network operations, real estate and facilities services, employee benefits and programs, travel,
and security and safety. By integrating all these services, the company delivers greater value,
creates lean processes and operations, leverages buying power, and simplifies access to services.
Harnessing the power of electronic-based transactions to improve service and drive down
cost is a key shared services strategy. The development of electronic portals for suppliers and
employees allows instant access to information from anywhere. The Shared Services Group
delivers major cost savings as the company puts in place its e-business applications, such as on-
line procurement and electronic auctions.
The third enabler is Process Councils, which link different business units throughout the
structure to realize synergies company-wide. The councils consist of leaders from all functional
groups in the company. Their role is to rapidly share best practices and diffuse its effects at
multiple levels across the enterprise.
Aligned with the goals of the Process Councils, the Leadership Center plays an important
role in communicating and educating lean to employees at different levels of the company. The
company's goal for the Leadership Center is to make it a central part of the shared experience for
all Boeing managers.
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3.2 VOUGHT AIRCRAFT
Vought Aircraft is a manufacturer of wings, fuselage subassemblies, empennages,
nacelles, thrust reversers, and other components for prime manufacturers of aircraft. Vought's
major customers are Boeing, Airbus, Gulfstream Aerospace, Lockheed Martin, Northrop
Grumman, Bell Helicopter, Cessna, and Embraer. The company headquarters are located in
Dallas, Texas. It employs 6,290 people, and recorded revenues of $1.2 billion as of the end of
2002.
For the past ten years, the company had experienced a variety of mergers and acquisitions.
In 1992, Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV) sold the assets of its aircraft division to The Carlyle Group
and Northrop Corp. Two years later, Northrop, following its acquisition of Grumman Corp.,
bought the remaining 51% of the Dallas and Grand Prairie operations from Carlyle. In July 2000,
The Carlyle Group bought Northrop Grumman's aerostructures business, and that business was
renamed Vought Aircraft Industries, Inc. and it remains based in Dallas. In July 2003, Vought
Aircraft Industries purchased The Aerostructures Corp, with manufacturing sites in Nashville,
Tennessee; Brea, California.; and Everett, Washington.
When Vought acquired Aerostructures Corp. in 2000, Vought did not have a structured
lean program. However, the company had specific positions related to lean within its
manufacturing operations and it has continued to focus on process improvements throughout the
total company. The company's CEO is focused on ensuring that they use the right tools, such as
value stream maps and JIT.
The company has not had a formal lean system, but it is trying to implement lean
techniques to meet and enhance its business needs. To that end, the company has implemented
lean manufacturing and supply chain management. It uses a Kanban system on the shop floor
and has achieved $100 million in inventory reductions. Also the company implemented lean with
its outside suppliers, and streamlined and computerized its SCM and HR systems, thus reducing
paperwork.
The acquired company, Aerostructures Corp., is not as lean as Vought, but its employees
are hungry to learn the new lean principles
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3.3 UTC/PRATT & WHITNEY
UTC is a global technology corporation working in aerospace, aviation, helicopter design,
climate control, elevator design, and hydrogen fuel cells. As a holding company, it has the
following companies as its business divisions: Carrier, Otis, Pratt & Whitney, Sikorsky, Chubb
Security, UTC power, and United Technologies Research Center. The company had $25.7 billion
revenue in 1998. Today it has 155,000 employees with $28.2 billion in revenue in 2002.
In 1999, the UTC acquired Sundstrand Corp. for $4.3 billion in cash and stock.
Sundstrand was a supplier of components and subsystems for aerospace and industrial customers,
including Boeing and Airbus. Sundstrand combined with UTC's Hamilton Standard division to
form one of the world's largest suppliers of high-value-added airframe components and
subsystems. The new division was named Hamilton Sundstrand. Reported 1998 sales were $2
billion, with 10,400 employees.
The acquisition was made to increase UTC's total system sales content per aircraft and
to provide one-stop-shopping for aircraft manufacturers seeking Auxiliary Power Units (APUs),
engine controls, hydraulics, and other items.
When the acquisition occurred in 1999, Pratt & Whitney, one of the UTC companies and
a customer of Sundstrand, was in the early stages of lean deployment but did not yet have
structured lean efforts. Hamilton Sundstrand, the new subsidiary, therefore started out closer to
the traditional company in terms of lean. After the acquisition, however, Pratt & Whitney began
to implement the transition to lean at Hamilton Sundstrand.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
4.1 INTERVIEWS
I interviewed seven people from different aerospace companies who were involved with
lean implementations and mergers and acquisitions. The case studies are listed in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 List of Cases
Case Buyer Company Target Company Number of Announcement
Interviewee
1 Boeing McDonnell Douglas 4 1997
2 Boeing Hughes Satellites 3 2000
3 Vought Aircraft Aerostructures Corp. 1 2000
4 UTC Sundstrand 1 1999
5 Boeing Suppliers 2 N/A
In Case 1, the interviewees are:
" A former Vice President of Boeing who worked for McDonnell Douglas before merger.
" A current Vice President of Boeing who worked for Boeing before merger.
" A current middle level manager of Boeing who worked for McDonnell Douglas before merger.
" A current middle level manager of Boeing who is in charge of supply chain management.
In Case 2, the interviewees are:
" A current mid-level manager of Boeing who is involved in the post-merger process with
Hughes Satellites.
" A former Vice President of Boeing who worked for Boeing during the acquisition (same
individual as above).
" A current Vice President of Boeing who worked for Boeing during the acquisition (same
individual as above).
In Case 3, the interviewee is:
" A current high-level manager of Vought Aircraft, who was in charge of materials before
Vought's acquisition of Aerostructure Corporation, and was involved in the acquisitions.
In Case 4, the interviewee is:
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" A former industrial engineer at Pratt & Whitney, who was responsible for converting
development into manufacturing and was involved in the lean transition at Hamilton
Sundstrand.
In Case 5, the interviewees are:
" A current mid-level manager of Boeing who is in charge of supply chain management (same
individual as above).
" A former Vice President of Boeing who worked for McDonnell Douglas before the merger
(same individual as above).
4.2 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
The main questions focused on the relationship between the lean enterprise and the
mergers and acquisitions, i.e., reasons for the merger or acquisition, changes that took place after
the merger or acquisition, barriers and solutions to implementing the lean transition in the new
organization, lessons learned, and the rate of lean effort after the merger or acquisition.
Appendix C contains a full set of the interview questions.
4.3 ANALYSIS METHOD
Following the interviews, I analyzed the data from the perspectives shown in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1 Analysis Method
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"Input data" means the level of maturity of lean implementation, practices, culture, and
integration before the merger or acquisition. This data was prepared from public information
sources and interview data.
"Process" shows what happened during the merger or acquisition in terms of lean efforts
and lean transition. The literature research about lean implementation and mergers and
acquisitions provided a perspective from which to analyze changes, problems, and solutions in
the process.
"Output" refers to the lessons and changes in the rate of lean efforts after a merger or
acquisition. In the case of the merger between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, I analyzed the
financial data, looking for validation of the changes in the rate of lean efforts.
Based on this framework, I developed a lean integration model of each merger or
acquisition. These models were developed using preliminary research information about the
company, interview data analysis, and the literature research about mergers and acquisitions.
This led me to identify common characteristics of successful lean transitions that can occur
during mergers and acquisitions, and the factors that should be considered.
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CHAPTER 5
CASE STUDIES
5.1 CASE 1-BOEING AND MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MERGER
5.1.1 Main Reason for the Merger
The merger was done for strategic reasons. McDonnell Douglas was a leader in the
defense industry, and Boeing was a leader in the commercial aerospace industry. Based on past
data of cyclical market ups and downs in the defense and commercial businesses, the merger was
anticipated by both companies as a way to avoid business risk. Even though management of both
companies knew that the companies had different levels of lean expertise, creating a lean
enterprise was not a reason for the merger.
5.1.2 Level of Lean Maturity in Both Companies Prior to the Merger
Boeing embarked on its implementation of lean manufacturing in the mid-1990s, and
McDonnell Douglas deployed its method of lean engineering in the early 1990s. However, while
Boeing's lean efforts were structured and initiated by management throughout the company,
McDonnell Douglas did not have a structured lean effort before the merger. It had no lean
enterprise office, and low-level managers did not fully understand the process being deployed by
management. The following quotes from former McDonnell Douglas managers show that the
varied perceptions of McDonnell Douglas's lean efforts.
"McDonnell Douglas was more excellent than Boeing in terms of lean engineering and
supply chain management."
- High-level manager at McDonnell Douglas
"MD did not have structured lean promotion. Lean effort was not as mature as Boeing
because MD did not have a promotion office on site, for example. In engineering,
McDonnell Douglas was better than Boeing, but I am not sure we can call it lean."
- Mid-level manager at McDonnell Douglas
Meanwhile, at Boeing, the entire company tried to understand lean manufacturing, but it
was not in place in all functions. The lean activities in place were led by the lean Boeing office
which fostered lean implementation at the enterprise, business unit, and floor levels. In contrast,
at McDonnell Douglas, the company used lean principles when needed, but not everyone in the
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company recognized the lean effort, even though the company had some level of expertise in
lean engineering.
Therefore, the merger that eventually took place between the two companies was a
merger between a medium-level lean company with manufacturing expertise and a medium to
low-level lean company with engineering expertise.
5.1.3 Changes in Lean Efforts After the Merger
After the merger, both companies took advantage of the opportunity to learn different
aspects of lean expertise from each other. Best practices were shared between both companies;
Boeing was good at the application of lean manufacturing to the assembly line and floor unit,
and McDonnell Douglas was good at design for manufacturing and lean engineering. Boeing's
lean manufacturing and systematic application methods were transferred to McDonnell Douglas,
and McDonnell Douglas' lean engineering practices were transferred to Boeing.
The result was that lean manufacturing was applied to the floor shop at McDonnell
Douglas, and designs for manufacturing were applied to Boeing's engineering site. Specifically,
integration technology used for military products at McDonnell Douglas was used for
commercial products manufactured by Boeing. This enabled Boeing to evolve its lean efforts
from manufacturing and supply chain management to lean engineering.
"Lean effort of Boeing moved from lean manufacturing to supply chain management and
lean engineering, affected by McDonnell Douglas."
- Mid-level manager of Boeing
Regarding supply chain management, both companies found opportunities to cut costs.
Recognizing that aerospace suppliers are common in commodity parts, both companies began to
share suppliers and components among different business units and programs. In specialty parts,
both companies maintained their existing partnership relationship with previous suppliers.
However, they were able to reduce the number of suppliers from 33,000 to 17,000 and managed
the supplier network using Boeing's supplier certification system. The merged company also
used an e-commerce system to streamline the ordering process from global suppliers, thereby
increasing the proportion of virtual integration in the supplier networks.
However, supply chain management of specialty suppliers was applied in a different
fashion because the philosophy of supply chain management was different between the
commercial and military sides and therefore each company's focus on the supply chain
management of specialty suppliers was different. The commercial side is more influenced by
cost pressures, but on the defense side, cost pressure is not as important. Ultimately, the supply
chain management practices of McDonnell Douglas were applied to the military side and those
of Boeing were applied to the commercial side of the merged company.
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"Supply chain management of both companies was differently focused; philosophy was
different, fundamental differences in commercial side and defense side. The Commercial side
is very influenced by cost pressure while cost pressure in defense side is not as important as
commercial side."
- Mid-level manager of Boeing
McDonnell Douglas' lean maturity model was very robust and used to measure the
performance of suppliers, which contributed to changes in Boeing's relationship with its
suppliers-from paternalistic relations to a partnership relationship based on trust. The new
Boeing company implemented a supplier certificate system to measure the operating efficiency
of suppliers and to motivate suppliers to accept lean principles and the quality management
system.
5.1.4 Barriers and Solutions to Lean Transition at the New Company
There were several barriers to lean transition between the two companies after the merger.
The first was objections from the union. McDonnell Douglas' union was not accustomed
to the new Japanese terms used in a lean enterprise, and the unions of both companies were not
willing to accept layoffs. To resolve the issue, the new company changed the Japanese terms to
English equivalents, and efforts were made to persuade the unions that lean techniques would
result in greater value in the long term although there would be layoffs in the short term.
Management told the unions that lean principles would bring the company more value by cutting
costs and streamlining operations, which would result in more job opportunities in the future.
Eventually, union officials agreed with management, and they increased their knowledge of lean
principles at an Accelerated Improvement Workshop offered by the company.
The second barrier was objections from mid-level managers who had heavy workloads
and did not want more work added because of organizational changes. This problem was solved
by rotating people into different functions at the various business units, which motivated people
to learn new practices from the other organization while not increasing their workload. In
addition, education and communication programs at the Leadership Center helped mid-level
managers understand the company's vision and their own role in the merged organization.
Exposure to new knowledge and practices, and communication with and education about other
levels in the company made mid-level managers feel that people in the new organization were
experiencing the changes together, and that there might be more opportunities for growth.
The third barrier was the cultural difference between the merged two companies. People
in one company did not recognize the excellence or expertise of those in the other. For example,
Boeing employees thought that Boeing was better than McDonnell Douglas, not only in lean
manufacturing but also in lean engineering. And the McDonnell Douglas people felt the same
way about their company. This problem was solved by rotating people through both companies
during the early stage of integration. People rotation enabled both parties to realize the
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differences between the two companies-their strengths and weaknesses-and then make
suggestions about what could be improved further.
Another cultural problem was that the goal of engineering on defense side is mission
assurance, and the lean culture at McDonnell Douglas was different from that of Boeing. On the
defense side, quality was the major focus, rather than cost; on the commercial side, cost was the
key consideration. This meant that the culture on the defense side was stricter. At the same time,
the strong engineering culture at McDonnell Douglas set higher standards for lean than was
generally the practice at Boeing-higher standards meant a higher goal for operating efficiency,
such as shorter product development cycle time and lower inventory levels. In the beginning,
these differences were not accepted by either company, and some managers who were not
accustomed to the new standard were moved to other positions. In the end, however, the higher
lean standards practiced at McDonnell Douglas raised overall standards for the new company,
supporting the goal of lean efforts at the integrated company.
The last problem was a standardization issue. After acquisition, both companies had to
consolidate their distinct lean principles in a way that would apply satisfactorily to these two
companies with different cultures. But, applying generalized principles to companies with
different cultures and expertise was not easy. When both sides admitted that standardization
would contribute to faster integration of the two companies, then there was more room for
improvement and a move toward customized principles for the integrated company. This
problem was solved when the Process Council was put in place. Employees from both
companies began to understand each other's expertise through job rotation and at workshops for
sharing best practice. People from various functions got together regularly and had conversations
about lean application to manufacturing, engineering, program management, and supply chain
management. In addition, through web pages, company letters, and other promotions of lean
practices, a common vision was actively fostered.
"But at Process Council, best practice was shared from both companies, where we found
that many of the best parts from both companies actually overlapped. In the end, MD's
supply chain management was applied to the defense side and Boeing's was used on the
commercial side, with common suppliers completed integrated."
- High level manager at Boeing
5.1.5 Lessons Learned
Leadership as part of a lean enterprise office is important when transitioning lean
principles to other organizations. Boeing's lean enterprise office took a leadership role in
increasing the momentum of lean transition to McDonnell Douglas. Before the merger, Boeing
already had a lean enterprise office which diffused lean practice through the company from the
top down, but McDonnell Douglas did not have such a lean office.
In general, both sides realized that a lean enterprise office contributes to better
communication of lean at the enterprise level, in the business units, and at the factory level. It
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also can provides training and metrics, establish a cohesive vision, track savings, decrease
defects and number of suppliers, and implement lean principles.
Communication and education are critical in a lean transition. The new companies held
workshops on lean principles, which included employees from every function and department,
with the goal of identifying and sharing best practices from practical experience. These
workshops helped both companies realize their strengths and weaknesses, and promoted a better
understanding of the lean status of both companies.
The usual pitfall in the applying best practices to a new company is that people are
willing to take generalized lean principles from best cases. However, in a lean transition between
two big companies like Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, it is important for the merged
companies to identify customized lean principles that apply to different functions, especially
when both companies' lean principles and expertise are so different.
"Education and communication are the key elements in improving the lean enterprise among
different functions and the two companies. The lean enterprise office was in charge of education
and communication, and it was established in different parts of the Boeing companies when
Boeing first began to embrace lean principles."
- High-level manager of Boeing
5.1.6 The Rate of Lean Efforts After the Merger
During interviews, I asked the following question, and most interviewees felt it was very
difficult to answer: did the lean efforts of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas accelerate?
Apparently, it was hard to answer because it is ambiguous to gauge the rate of lean effort, and
because there are various standards for measuring the level of lean application. In some areas,
the rate may have increased, but in other areas perhaps not.
However, the common opinion among interviewees was that both companies have
different levels of expertise with lean, and the spectrum of their lean efforts is becoming broader.
Boeing absorbed the practices of lean engineering from McDonnell Douglas, and McDonnell
Douglas assimilated the practices of lean manufacturing from Boeing. Meanwhile, the supply
chains in the new integrated Boeing have evolved and improved.
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5.2 CASE 2 - BOEING'S ACQUISITION OF HUGHES SPACE
AND COMMUNICATIONS
5.2.1 Main Reason for the Acquisition
Satellites are a key element in the defense business. Boeing's growth strategy is to be an
operating system maker, with specific focus on networks and satellites, beyond its original
business as an airplane manufacturer.
5.2.2 Level of Lean Maturity in Both Companies Prior to Acquisition
In 2000, when Boeing acquired Hughes Space and Communications, lean maturity within
Boeing had been evolving steadily following the merger with McDonnell Douglas. Hughes
Space and Communications (owned by General Motors before acquisition by Boeing) had also
deployed lean, but its efforts were less successful. Thus, Boeing's acquisition of Hughes makes
an interesting integration case between a medium to high-level lean company and a low-level
lean company, which had structured but less successful lean experiences and different lean
principles than those practiced at Boeing. Even though the lean efforts at Hughes were less
successful before its acquisition, the company did in fact have its own lean manufacturing
system in place and was practicing some lean techniques. And it was generally agreed that both
companies would focus on adjusting Hughes' lean principles to the Boeing style rather than
setting up new principles after the acquisition.
"Hughes came with their lean principles. The issue during the integration process was much
more about alignment of lean principles."
- Mid-level manager of Boeing
5.2.3 Changes in Lean Efforts After Acquisition
What has changed at Hughes since the acquisition was a decision to focus on operational
efficiency. Metrics and visual controls on the shop floor were established. A cultural shift-from
a focus on quality to a focus on cost-led lean efforts from the shop floor to the office. Tooling,
tactics, and support groups for operational efficiency were improved and goals were visualized.
5.2.4 Barriers and Solutions to Lean Transition at the New Company
Currently, the lean transition following Boeing's acquisition of Hughes is still ongoing.
The biggest barrier was a cultural shift in the business. Fundamentally, the satellite business does
not focus on operations because quality rather than cost is usually the issue in such programs.
But Boeing's lean practices evolved from its lean manufacturing processes in place for the
manufacture of Boeing commercial airplanes. Thus, the change of focus, from quality to cost in
the satellite industry, has not been easy for Hughes employees. Today, the new company uses a
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matrix structure that focuses on both quality and operations, with leadership operations coming
from a lean office.
"There was a big cultural shift, and the shift is ongoing. In the satellite business, the first
goal was mission assurance and the second was operational efficiency. Hughes had not
focused on operations as much as Boeing. Lean engineering comes after manufacturing:
they do not come together."
- Mid-level manager of Boeing
The less-successful experience of lean deployment at Hughes prior to acquisition by
Boeing was also another barrier. Even though the company had a lean promotion team, no one
on the team wanted to be involved in lean. So Boeing hired new people from outside Hughes to
start over again with lean and to identify and implement new lean strategies, in order to remove
the less successful experience at Hughes in the past.
"There was a lean promotion team in lean satellites. They were responsible for the lean
maturity target and operational improvements. No one wanted to be associated with the
lackluster success of lean deployment in the past, and people were very cautious about
starting over again with lean. One solution was to recruit people from outside."
- Mid-level manager of Boeing
5.2.5 Lessons Learned
Typically, lean engineering follows after lean manufacturing; they do not evolve at the
same time. But at Hughes, both were considered simultaneously because the manufacturing part
of the satellite business was too small to start lean, and most of the satellite business related to
the engineering side anyway.
5.2.6 The Rate of Lean Efforts After Acquisition
When asked about the rate of lean efforts after Boeing's acquisition of Hughes, some
interviewees answered that the rate had increased because Hughes had had some lean experience
before the acquisition. However, another interviewee who was involved in the early stages of
the lean transition after acquisition answered that the past experience at Hughes actually
hindered the rate of lean implementation after the acquisition by Boeing.
Based on this data, I found that it takes more time to stabilize a lean transition into an
acquired company which has had a less-successful experience with lean deployment, due to a
reluctance among employees to be involved in lean implementation. But once this stumbling
block passes, by hiring new people and developing a matrix organization focused on both cost
and quality, employees are motivated to foster new successes, and the lean assets owned by the
acquired company actually accelerate the lean transition effort.
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5.3 VOUGHT AIRCRAFT'S ACQUISITION OF
AEROSTRUCTURE CORPORATION
5.3.1 Main Reason for the Acquisition
The main reason for acquisition was to expand Vought's customer base and reduce
business risk in its markets. Both companies had different customer bases-Vought's main
customer was Boeing, and Aerostructure's main customer was Airbus. The new company's
business portfolio goal was to reach a 50:50 ratio of military to commercial customers.
5.3.2 Level of Lean Maturity in Both Companies Prior to Acquisition
Vought originally implemented lean manufacturing to meets its internal needs. People in
the company used tools, such as value-stream mapping and reduced inventory, even though they
were not identified as lean principles. The company did not have a lean office, but lean efforts
were being led by management and supported by some lean experts in the company. However,
the lean effort overall was not fostered throughout the company.
The target company, Aerostructure Corporation, was not as lean as Vought, but was
closer to a traditional company.
So this case represents an acquisition by a company with a low level of lean maturity and
a traditional company with no experience related to lean.
"Our company does not have aformulated program for lean as might be identified in other
companies. We have specific positions within manufacturing and we continue to focus on process
improvements of the total company. Our CEO focuses on making sure that we use the right tools,
such as value stream mapping. The company does not have aformalized system of lean
implementation but tries to execute lean techniques to meet our business needs."
- High-level manager of Vought
5.3.3 Changes in Lean Efforts after Acquisition
Vought learned how to manage employees and engineers with respect to releasing
information to the shop floor in a timed sequence. When both companies' computer systems
were merged, this time-keeping strategy was helpful for controlling materials on the floor and at
the supply base. Also both companies could utilize a centralized supply chain management
system and were able to reduce the total number of suppliers. In addition, Vought introduced
international suppliers into the supply chain of the acquired company.
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5.3.4 Barriers and Solutions to Lean Transition at the New Company
There were few barriers to the lean transition in the acquired company because
employees in the newly integrated company were very positive about the acquisition and highly
responsive to accepting lean techniques. The reason for the acquisition and the vision of the new
company were clear to everyone and fully accepted by employees in both companies.
"People in both companies were very supportive of the acquisition. Everyone knows the
importance of Vought balanced business portfolio in the aerospace industry."
- High-level manager of Vought aircraft
For the efficient transition to a lean enterprise, people at Aerostructure came to the
Vought site, and Vought sent lean experts to Aerostructure. They formed a transitions and
operations team which consisted of people from different sites in both companies. The team
discussed about how to apply lean principles to the new company and everyone shared best
practices. Throughout this process, Vought did not push, which made both parties very positive
about the lean transition.
"The transition team and operation team from the different sites helped other sites
implement lean techniques. One of the sites achieved a 30% improvement in materials
efficiency, and other sites also realized small achievements."
- High-level manager of Vought aircraft.
5.3.5 Lessons Learned
The process review during due diligence helped both companies make the decision to
pursue acquisition early. Identification of cultural, organizational, and operational fits between
the companies were reviewed at the due diligence stage.
This suggests that to facilitate a lean transition during mergers and acquisitions, the
companies should review the lean maturity or operational efficiency of the target company
during the due diligence stage. The transition to a lean enterprise requires time and money, and
there may be tradeoffs between potential synergies and the cost of the transition.
The biggest lesson is that regardless of different levels of lean maturity and expertise
between two companies in a merger or acquisition, the first step for the successful lean transition
during the integration process is to understand the reason for the integration and to define a
shared vision and culture.
Maintaining the partner relationship between the acquiring and acquired companies is
also very important for a lean transition, promoting the sense of one company among employees
of both companies and accelerating the rate of knowledge sharing. Shared learning through
people exchanges and discussions about best practices not only increases the rate of learning but
also contributes to the common vision and culture of the newly integrated company.
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5.4 CASE 4 -UTC/PRATT & WHITNEY'S ACQUISITION OF
HAMILTON SUNDSTRAND
This case involves UTC, which acquired Sundstrand and made a new company called
Hamilton Sundstrand, and Pratt & Whitney's subsequent implementation of a lean transition to
Hamilton Sundstrand.
5.4.1 Main Reasons for the Acquisition
Pratt & Whitney wanted to create a niche market, and Hamilton could provide complete
external control system solutions to other engine makers.
Another reason was cost savings. UTC could realize some synergy savings by reducing
headcount. And because Hamilton was a supplier to P&W, UTC was familiar with the cost
savings it could achieve by buying Hamilton's products.
A third reason was that UTC wanted to take on the whole-system approach used by
Hamilton, which had added knowledge of other engine companies.
5.4.2 Level of Lean Maturity in Both Companies Prior to Acquisition
At the time of acquisition in 1999, P&W had a more mature lean enterprise than
Hamilton, that is, P&W had more lean resources than Hamilton. But both companies were in the
early stage of lean implementation, so could be classified as closer to traditional companies than
to lean companies.
5.4.3 Changes in Lean Efforts After Acquisition
Technologically, P&W gained some component expertise from Hamilton. Both
companies realized new business and increased revenue. But there were few benefits in terms of
lean or operating improvement on either side.
5.4.4 Barriers and Solutions to Lean Transition at the New Company
UTC's overall policy for acquiring companies is that the company wants to remain a
holding company with equivalent companies under the UTC entity. But the UTC entity is too
loose to bind P&W and Hamilton as one company. Further, it became increasingly difficult for
both companies to develop a cohesive vision and share knowledge.
In this case, although Hamilton was a supplier to P&W, this acquisition was not a vertical
integration. Hamilton was an equivalent company to P&W under the UTC umbrella. However,
employees at P&W did not think like that. Because Pratt & Whitney had lean practices and
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resources, it (rather than UTC) tried to lead the lean transition at Hamilton. As time went by,
people at P&W viewed its relationship with Hamilton as that of supplier and customer, and it
became difficult for both companies to maintain a strong relationship. Instead, the relationship
was closer to a customer-supplier relationship after the acquisition.
Another problem was the bureaucratic culture at Hamilton, and UTC did not provide a
single voice during high-level decisions, and no priority was given to the transition. P&W had
negative feelings toward Hamilton, and Hamilton had negative feelings about not being able to
meet the requirements and provide resources to P&W. Today, this problem is ongoing, and no
relevant solutions have yet to be recommended.
"UTC's policy when acquiring a company-limited integration under the holding company
-makes the acquiring company and the target company thinks they are not part of one
company, thus hindering both companies' ability to share the same vision and knowledge."
- Mid-level manager of Pratt & Whitney
5.4.5 Lessons Learned
When two companies merge or one company acquires the other, the key is to foster a
common vision with common leadership. Both companies should establish teams to facilitate
integration, and the two companies should work together as one profit center. There should be a
centralized lean office responsible for continuous lean improvements. The new company should
focus on process improvements using a common supply chain management system and the
similarly skilled people in similar functions.
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5.5 CASE 5-LEAN TRANSITION BETWEEN BOEING AND ITS SUPPLIERS
This case is about supply chain management rather than a merger or acquisition. Lean
supply chain management involves considerable work to implement a lean transition among
suppliers that have a culture and vision that differs from Boeing's. The focus of this case study is
to present some ideas about how to make lean transition work between very different
organizations.
5.5.1 Barriers to Lean Supply Chain Management Transition at Boeing
Boeing has a good understanding of lean at the enterprise level as well as the impact of
lean on business, especially in a downturn. However, many of its suppliers do not. Therefore it is
not easy for Boeing to share its vision and culture with suppliers that do not know much about
the lean enterprise or its techniques. As Boeing has tried to teach its suppliers, I believe it can
offer a prescription for transitioning lean to a company's suppliers.
Another barrier was making the rest of Boeing understand how suppliers are integrated
into Boeing's supply chain management, and how the merger of Boeing's vision and values with
those of suppliers would occur. Those who are not involved in such a delicate job do not
understand the process, and thus are more willing to simply impose the initiative on suppliers
without bringing them along in the process.
5.5.2 Solutions to Transitioning Lean Techniques to Suppliers
The first time a company begins to transit lean principles to its suppliers, an
understanding each supplier's infrastructure capability is very important for measuring the lean
capability of that supplier. Infrastructure capability defines the supplier's ability to handle
information flow with IT technology, as well as people, flow-time buffers, and material parts.
Also it enables the lean company to estimate how much of the lean company's infrastructure
should be understood by the supplier and how to apply its lean principles to the supplier target.
The next step for lean transition to a supplier is to create an environment where the
company works together with a supplier to find the best way to generate respect for each other
and to resolve problems. Meanwhile, the company and supplier can meet regularly to develop
one voice-an important component for building trust and increasing transition efficiency.
The last step is to determine different methods for handling suppliers that are at different
levels of lean maturity or lean capability. Some suppliers are mature in terms of lean knowledge
and deployment, while some are not.
The ultimate goal of the transition job is to share the company's vision with its suppliers
and to merge suppliers into the company production system and supply chain management
system efficiently and smoothly.
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Table 5.1 shows different strategies that can be utilized for suppliers with different lean
maturities or level of understanding.
Table 5.1 Various Lean Transition Strategies for Suppliers with Different Lean Maturities
Lean Maturity Solutions Focus
Medium to High Much conversation to help both parties understand both Production system
Level companies' production systems.
Much conversation about how each supplier can align Alignment of supply
Medium to Low its supply chain management with Boeing, and which chain management
Level leverage point or integration method can be used. system between the two
companies
Usually these suppliers are not healthy financially. Both
Low Level parties discuss lean concepts and how to optimize Concept andprojections. Conversations start from lean techniques Conct and
applicable to each supplier's enterprise level and then application of lean
move to the supply chain management level.
Limited It is difficult for both parties to achieve an outcome
Experience with easily because suppliers need to first understand
Lean Boeing's lean terminology, techniques, production Basic concept of lean
system, and vision.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
6.1 DATA SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Table 6.1 summarizes the interview data. The input data in the table refers to the status of
each company before the relevant merger or acquisition. The process data refers to the kind of
process or change(s) that occurred during the merger or acquisition. Output data is the result after
the merger or acquisition has occurred.
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Table 6.1 Interview Data Summary
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Company Boeing McDonnell Boeing Hughes Space and Vought Aircraft Aerostructure UTC (Pratt & HamiltonDouglas Comm. Whitney) Sundstrand
Level of Lean Medium Medium-Low Medium-High Low Level Medium-Low Traditional Low-Level Traditional
Structured, but
Lean Practice Structured Less structured Structured not successful Less structured None Less structured Nonelean
manufacturing
Lean
Input Leadership Lean Office Top Management Lean Office N/A Management N/A Management N/A
Expertise Manufacturing Engineering Manufacturing Engineering Manufacturing N/A Manufacturing N/A
Business Focus Commercial Military Commercial Space Commercial and Commercial Engine Engine Control
I Military (Airbus) System
Quality focused Quality focused Not prescriptive Positive for
Culture Cost focused Strong Engineering ost focused Mission Partnership with acquisitions and Engineering Engineering andLean Leadership Culture Lean Leadership Assurance acquired culture Bureaucratic
____________ 
___C____ture 
______Assuran_______e cmaylearning lean
IntegrationI 
copn
Type Mutual Best of Both Dominant Company Dominant Company Limited Integration
e Diffusion of Lean manufacturing and 9 Focus on manufacturing efficiency e IT system integration * Time keeping strategy for the shop
Engineering at Hughes site * Time keeping strategy for the shop floor
Changes * Common supply chain management 9 Visualized goals floor * Reduction of the suppliers
* Relationships with suppliers e Reduction of the suppliers * Sharing international suppliers
* Expansion of virtual integration in * Sharing international suppliers
suppliers network
Process 9 Unions and Middle Level Managers * Cultural Shift from quality to cost e Few Barriers * Weak structure of holding companyProblems * Cultural Differences in space business * Sharing vision and knowledge
* Standardization * Less successful lean experience * Relation of customer and supplier
9 Education through Workshop 9 Matrix Organizations to consider * Exchange people and experts * Not yet found
* Employees Rotations quality and cost 9 Transition and Operations team
Solutions 9 Knowledge and vision sharing at the 9 Recruiting new people outside from both companies
process councils and leadership
center
e Lean leadership * Lean engineering and * Early review of operation culture * Common vision with common
Lessons e Education and Communications manufacturing come together in and organizational structure at the leadership required
* Getting best practice space business which has strong due diligence is the key for the
Output engineering expertise successful integration.
* Not sure. But the lean area becomes * Slow at the early stage when * Not sure 1 Not sure
Rate of Lean broad mindset change is required * Transition was quick e Lean effort evolved separately
Effort * Fast at the later stage, due to the without lean transition
I I_ I lean asset of acquired company
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6.1.1 Discussion of Case 1
Case 1 is Boeing's merger with McDonnell Douglas-a merger of similar lean-level
companies which had different expertise. Education, communications, and leadership contributed
to sharing a common vision and acquiring best practices from each other. Boeing pulled in the
lean engineering practices from McDonnell Douglas, and McDonnell Douglas took on the lean
manufacturing practices of Boeing. Meanwhile, common suppliers were integrated and virtual
integration through a shared e-commerce system was expanded. These efforts were enabled by
infrastructure developed and provided by Boeing's Shared Services Group. Figure 6.1 illustrates
this case.
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Figure 6.1 The integration model for the Merger Between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas
In Chapter 2 on the literature research, I pointed out the importance of leadership,
communication, and cultures in the integration process. In this specific integration, Boeing's
lean office and its Leadership Center contributed to leading the integration. The role of the lean
office is to foster a company's lean vision, culture, and practices at the enterprise level, business
unit level, and platform level. Boeing has lean offices at each site and regularly exchanges
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people to different sites to encouraging sharing of knowledge. The Leadership Center takes a
similar role. There, different levels of managers communicate with each other about the
company's vision and share best practices.
The Process Council and the workshops it offered contributed to educating and
communicating with employees from both companies. As described in Chapter 2, the role of the
Process Council is to recognize the synergies in the different business units of the company and
increase the efficiency of sharing practices and diffusing their effects at different levels in the
newly integrated company.
The Shared Services Group provided the infrastructure for the integration process. As
could be seen in Figure 3.9 (in Chapter 3), the number of people in the Shared Services Group
increased after the merger, even while the total number of employees was decreasing. This
means that the company strengthened the role of the Shared Services Group to make it an enabler
of enterprise integration. The Shared Services Group contributed to enhanced communications
through web pages and an internal communication systems, and added to the company's cost
savings by achieving economies of scale through shared parts and supplies-buying common
parts and office supplies through a strong e-commerce system. With that system, the company
expanded the virtual integration of its supplier network and shared information with its suppliers.
For example, the company now uses auctions, available via the e-commerce system, to buy
common parts more cheaply.
6.1.2 Discussion of Case 2
Case 2 is Boeing's acquisition of Hughes Aerospace-the integration of a medium to
high-level lean company and a low-level lean company.
The biggest challenge in the lean transition during integration was the lack of
commitment among employees due to a less-than-successful lean deployment experience at
Hughes in the past. This slowed the learning curve at the early stage of lean transition in the new
company. Through the use of communication and education, the company resolved this problem
by recruiting new people from outside the organization.
The second challenge was a culture shift for those working in the space industry, who
were focused on quality rather than cost. The solution was to help people experience both lean
manufacturing and engineering, to change their mindset, by constructing a matrix organization.
Currently, it is too early to tell whether these efforts will be successful or not. However, one
thing is a lean asset-Hughes' employees now understand lean principles better and it has
contributed to faster acceptance of lean coming from Boeing.
Meanwhile, these solutions, in conjunction with the lean office, have constructed an
education and communication plan, motivated people's commitment, and played a leadership
role, and thereafter the lean transition accelerated. These dynamics are shown in Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2 The integration model for Boeing and Hughes
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Cases 3 and 4 are based on limited data, so the results must viewed as preliminary
findings.
6.1.3 Discussion of Case 3
This case is Vought's acquisition of Aerostructure, i.e., the integration of a medium to
low-level lean company with a traditional company.
Both companies experienced few barriers during the lean transition in the integration
process, even though there were differences between the two companies in terms of their
respective levels of lean maturity. This experience of relative ease was due largely to the fact that
people in both companies were positive about the acquisition. Also that the new company's
shared vision and values were communicated actively, because both companies anticipated
strengthening the customer portfolio and avoiding business risks by acquiring Boeing and Airbus
as customers of the new company. Thus people at all levels of both companies understood the
rationale for the acquisition.
In addition, cultural, organizational, and operational differences were considered at the
outset of the due diligence stage, when the Process Council (consisting of employees from both
companies) helped everyone to understand the differences of culture and lean experience. This
meant that people in the acquired company were eager to learn lean practices, and lean experts
were sent to the acquired company. Integration of both IT systems helped each company share
their suppliers quickly. The integration model for this case is shown in Figure 6.3.
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Figure 6.3 The integration model for Vought and Aerostructure
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6.1.4 Discussion of Case 4
Case 4 is UTC's acquisition of Sundstrand and Pratt & Whitney's lean transition to
Hamilton Sundstrand, i.e., the integration of a low-level lean company with a traditional
company.
In this case, the focus is the integration philosophy and political relationships of the
companies involved in the acquisition. The context of this acquisition is that UTC acquired
Sundstrand and made Hamilton Sundstrand, and then Pratt & Whitney tried to implement a lean
transition to Hamilton Sundstrand. Complicating the transition, however, was the fact that
Hamilton Sundstrand was a supplier to Pratt & Whitney, and the acquisition made it one of
UTC's subsidiaries at the same level as Pratt & Whitney. The result was that Pratt & Whitney
viewed Hamilton Sundstrand as a supplier, and Hamilton Sundstrand thought of itself as an
equal-level company to Pratt & Whitney.
In the end, Pratt & Whitney was responsible for the lean transition, and Hamilton
Sundstrand was not willing to follow it. If the holding company, UTC, had tried to implement
the lean transition using lean leadership and strong company culture, it would have been easier
for Hamilton Sundstrand to accept the lean transition.
Also, both companies should have been informed their respective employees of the
rationale for the acquisition and made strong efforts to share their common vision through
communication.
Thus, the lack of lean leadership and a weak culture in the holding company were barriers
to a successful lean transition, which hindered the rate of lean efforts in both companies. This
dynamic is illustrated in Figure 6.4.
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Figure 6.4 The integration model for Pratt & Whitney and Hamilton Sundstrand
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6.2 VALIDATION USING FINANCIAL INFORMATION
Because I had limited access to company information, I could use only public
information to determine whether Boeing's various mergers and acquisitions accelerated or
decelerated the company's efforts to enhance its lean enterprise.
It is not easy to measure changes of leanness in a company after a merger or acquisition
because the principles of lean can affect sections of the financial statements; it is also difficult to
determine the effects of a specific merger or acquisition on leanness. Lean as a culture requires
considerable company time to embrace the concept into its culture and organization. And
earnings and equity value are often affected by macro economies and financial markets rather
than by improvements to internal operations.
To measure changes in leanness as a result of the mergers and acquisitions, I made
several assumptions based on information already provided in Table 3.2 (see Chapter 3).
" The merger with McDonnell Douglas in 1997 had the largest effect on the financial statement.
" The several acquisitions made by Boeing in 2000 had the second-largest effect on the
financial statement.
" Inventory turnover shows how efficiently a company manages its inventory on the shop floor,
and parts from suppliers through supply chain management system.
" Asset turnover, ROIC, and ROA-usually strong measures of leanness-were only
considered as references rather than as the main measures of leanness in the company,
because the time period to gauge leanness was too short and those measures are greatly
affected by the environment outside the company.
Based on these assumptions, I developed Figure 6.5, which shows the ratio analysis of
Boeing based on its financial statements.
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Figure 6.5 Ratio Analysis
Between 1997 and 1999, when the merger with McDonnell Douglas affected Boeing's
financial statement, inventory turnover, asset turnover, ROA, and ROE accelerated. Figure 6.6
shows ROIC increasing during this period.
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Figure 6.6 Boeing's ROIC Analysis
The increase in inventory turnover has two meanings. The first is that the manufacturing
floor minimized materials waste and managed employees very efficiently. The second is that the
company shared production information with its suppliers to successfully implement a Just-In-
Time system. The data proves that Boeing's merger with McDonnell Douglas increased
operating efficiency both in materials and people. Figure 3.4 (Chapter 3) also supports this.
Considering the limitations of measuring leanness in a company based on financial
information, I can only conclude that the merger with McDonnell Douglas at least did not
decelerate the lean effort-especially in the manufacturing and supply chain management. But it
is harder to conclude that the merger in fact accelerated lean efforts.
After 2000, when Boeing acquired several companies, including Hughes Aerospace,
inventory turnover and ROA decreased. ROA and ROIC fluctuated while ROE increased.
Before drawing a conclusion as to whether Boeing's various mergers and acquisitions in
2000 accelerated the company's lean effort or not, other factors need to be considered. The poor
market situation on the commercial and defense side may have had an affect on the decrease of
inventory turnover, ROIC, sales, and earning ratios between 2000 and 2001.
Therefore, it is not certain that the several acquisitions in 2000 decreased these ratios or
make the company avoid a steeper fall-off from those ratios. For a clearer conclusion, more
information about the different industries and internal financial information are necessary.
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6.3 FINDINGS FROM THE CASE STUDIES
From Case 1 (Boeing and McDonnell Douglas), Case 2 (Boeing and Hughes), and Case 3
(Vought and Aerostructure), I found that leadership, communications, and education played
pivotal roles in the successful lean transition following the respective merger or acquisition.
The role of a lean office was very important in that it played a leadership role in the early
stage of the lean transition during the integration process, and it provided the education and
communications needed to share lean expertise and knowledge in the later stage.
The Process Council and its workshops offered a community of practice throughout the
knowledge management process, generating and sharing best practices throughout the entire
enterprise. IT infrastructure provided people with high-tech communications tools and a strong
knowledge base.
In Case 1, the main focus by both companies on sharing vision and knowledge based on
leadership, communications, and education was important in the early stage of lean transition
during the integration process. In the later stage of the lean transition, different levels of lean
expertise began take affect.
In Case 2, both companies consumed considerable time changing the engineering culture
of the target company and motivating people. The lean assets of the target company showed their
value in the later stage of the lean transition.
In Case 3, the rationale for the acquisition was very important in the early stage of the
integration process. Understanding this clear rationale for the acquisition motivated people in
both companies toward a common goal and shared vision. It was a catalyst for learning new
knowledge and accepting the new culture, regardless of differences in lean expertise.
In contrast to Case 3, Case 4 showed that political relationships between the acquiring
company and the target company are important for implementing lean transition, and for sharing
knowledge and culture. One important lesson was the recognition that who retains leadership in
the holding company structure affects whether or not the integrating companies can easily
develop a shared vision.
Additionally, all of the cases highlighted the fact that a negotiated strategy for lean
transition is the most efficient. In Case 1, the imposed strategy pursued by McDonnell Douglas
- setting a higher goal of lean than that of Boeing - created problems by making McDonnell
Douglas people appear to be quite rigid to the Boeing people. In the case of UTC, the lean
transition by Pratt & Whitney, one of their customers, also seemed directive from the perspective
of the Hamilton Sundstrand people. In Case 2, those who had a less-successful experience with
lean deployment would benefit from a negotiated strategy that encourages people to accept lean
knowledge. The negotiated strategy, pursued later in Case 1 and from the outset in Case 3, were
effective for sharing knowledge. An agreed vision and clear rationale for the acquisition
motivated people to actively accept new knowledge, and the Process Councils of both companies
introduced change initiatives by exchanging people and experts from both sites.
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In conclusion, the differences of lean maturity and lean expertise between the acquiring
company and the target company generally have less prominence in the early stage of merger
discussions, but have a major impact afterward. Also, mitigating factors on the impact of a
merger, such as uncertainty and instability regarding lean principles is dependent on educating
people about the underlying logic of the merger.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 CONCLUSIONS
In a lean transition that takes place following a merger or acquisition, it is very important
to determine and convey a clear vision and rationale for the integration. The lack of a clear vision
or rationale will be costly because employees find it harder to cope with the uncertainty of the
integration process, and leadership will much less effective in the later stages of integration.
Second, differences in terms of culture, lean maturity, and lean expertise should be
considered in the due diligence stage when the parties are getting to know each other. Then,
management can become prepared for the kinds of barriers that may develop in the integration
process, for the costs of developing preliminary solutions, for removing the barriers to lean
transition in the early stages, and finally for minimizing uncertainties in the integration process.
Third, the integration process of lean companies requires leadership, communication, and
education for the companies involved in the process. These requirements are important for
motivating employees to accept new knowledge and share best practices. The lean office can
take a leadership and communication role, and the Process Council can establish communities of
practice and education throughout the knowledge-transfer processes and into post-merger
improvements.
Finally, it is important for the companies involved in a lean transition during a merger or
acquisition to determine what areas, resources, and expertise can be shared and what cannot be
shared. For common areas, resources, or expertise, standardized lean principles can be applied;
for areas where resources or expertise differ, customized lean principles must be applied. This
strategy minimizes wasteful conflict and has the positive effect of making the lean transition
show earlier than expected.
7.2 ROADMAP FOR LEAN TRANSITION DURING INTEGRATION
Based on the case studies and research, I recommend the following roadmaps for
successful lean transition in an integration process following merger or acquisition:
1. Establish a clear rationale for the merger/acquisition in order to obtain support from different
stakeholders and a shared common vision.
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2. Determine barriers to the lean transition, such as cultural and operational differences, during
the due diligence stage.
3. Clarify the lean capabilities already available in each company, such as different levels of
lean expertise and expertise with IT systems.
4. Construct a Process Council consisting of managers from different functions of both
companies; also workshops for education. Select a leader, such as a lean office, to take the
role of guiding the transition.
5. Process and diffuse knowledge from the workshops and councils and actively encourage
interactions among employees and functions through the IT infrastructure and via people
exchanges.
6. Find common areas of lean expertise and standardize practices for those common areas.
Diffuse different lean expertise in one company to the same area in the other company and
develop customized approaches.
7. Implement lean principles at the enterprise level, business unit level, and factory level.
Measure the effect and rate of lean effort and give feedback to the councils and lean offices.
These processes are shown in Figure 7.1.
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7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
In Case 1 (Boeing and McDonnell Douglas), standardization and customization of lean
principles could have been more deeply leveraged as relevant, because both companies had
different business areas and cultures. Determining what should be standardized and what should
be customized accelerates the lean effort and reduces conflict among principles used in different
industries and cultures. What ended up being a successful integration could have been
accelerated by at least a year or more with such attention.
In Case 2 (Boeing and Hughes), it would have been better had the companies extracted
the best practices of Hughes earlier in the lean transition. That would have given some small
successes to people at Hughes and accelerated the rate of lean effort and lean transition in both
companies.
In Case 3 (Vought and Aerostructure), a structured lean transition effort, such as lean
offices, would have made the effort more efficient. However, the advance calibration during the
due diligence stage has the potential to be an industry best practice - worthy of further study and
replication by others.
In Case 4 (Pratt & Whitney and Hamilton Sundstrand), UTC could have assumed a
greater lean leadership role by having a lean office that was in charge of the lean effort for all the
subsidiary companies, instead of allowing only Pratt & Whitney to lead the lean transition with
Hamilton Sundstrand.
7.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
For this thesis, I believe there were a limited number of cases and a limited number of
interviews in each case. As a result, this work must be seen as an exploratory study. However, it
can be used as a springboard for generating potential general principles of lean transition during
mergers and acquisitions. Further confirmatory research based on more interviews with people
from different functions and positions at more levels in the organizational hierarchy, would
produce more detailed information about the lean transition during mergers and acquisitions.
Additional interviews with a more diverse set of employees will give insight into how the
different elements of lean manufacturing, engineering, and supply chain management change
after a merger or acquisition. Also more interviews will provide more accurate information about
the leanness of a company before and after a merger/acquisition. More inside information about
each business unit would more accurately inform how the rate of lean effort has changed and
how different areas of lean expertise changed at different rates.
A lean transition during a merger or acquisition at the international level would also be an
interesting case because cultural differences in the international setting would make an added
overlay on the differences in lean expertise and corporate culture.
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Finally, more quantitative analysis is needed. Quantification of input data, such as lean
level and culture, and output data about changes in the rate of lean effort will give a clearer
perspective on the factors that affect lean transitions during mergers and acquisitions.
7.5 CONCLUDING COMMENT
A merger or acquisition is a major event in the history of an organization. Lean
transformation is an ongoing process that has the potential to have just as dramatic an impact.
This thesis has examined the inter-relationships between the two. Wee see that there are many
ways in which the potential associated with lean capability can be undercut or delayed as a result
of a merger or acquisition. At the same time, with proper attention to the prior expertise in both
organizations, an expansion of lean capability is possible. I hope this thesis helps organizations
to realize this potential.
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APPENDIX A
Mergers and Acquisitions of Boeing since 1996 (Buying).
No Deal Type Purpose Announce Company Products Deal Brief
DesignsalakBsiaf
No Del Tye Pupose Date
McDonnell Designs, makes and Boeing has acquired McDonnell Douglas, offering 1.3 of its shares
I Acquisition. Horizontal 15-Dec-96 Douglas supports military for each McDonnell Douglas share outstanding. The deal values
Corp aircraft systems and McDonnell at $76.29 per share, or a total of $15.454 billion.
related products
Provides software The Boeing Co acquired Autometric for an undisclosed amount.products and services Boeing is focusing its growth in the space and communications
2 Acquisition. Vertical 1-Jun-00 Autometric in the geospatial areas that include classified government program opportunities,
technology the movement of broadband information on and off mobile
marketplace platforms, and integrated military systems.
Publishes a variety of The Boeing Co acquired Jeppesen Sanderson, the world's number
3 Divestiture Horizontal 15-Aug-00 Jeppesen aviation-related one provider of flight information services, from Tribune Co for
material and $1.5 billion in cash. Tribune will use the proceeds from the sale to
information reduce debt and repurchase stock.
Provides customized
Continental and specialized The Boeing Co acquired Continental Graphics for an undisclosed
4 Acquisition Horizontal 6-Sep-00 Graphics technical information amount. This acquisition will bolster Boeings offering of
Corp to the aviation information to airlines and aviation companies.
industry
The Boeing Co acquired Conquest Inc for an undisclosed amount,
Provides system confirming its vision of developing an integrated battle space, a
engineering and network-centric system that enables all dissimilar legacy platforms
. .0 Conquest software technology from many different branches of the intelligence community to
5 Acquisition Horizontal I0-Jan-03 Inc solutions to the operate together, no matter where you are. Currently, Conquest
intelligence has 20 contracts with other companies valued at approximately
community $250 million, and as a result of the acquisition, Conquest nowbecomes the Maryland division of Boeing Space and Intelligence
Systems. The transaction was closed on February 11, 2003.
86
No Deal Type Purpose Announce Company Products Deal BriefDate Cmay Pout
Designs and Boeing Australia, acquired Hawker de Havilland from Tenix
Hawker de manufactures aircraft Holdings International for an undisclosed amount. The acquisition6 Divestiture Horizontal 17-Oct-00 Havilland and related enables Boeing to lower manufacturing costs through increased
components operating efficiencies.
Provides advanced Boeing acquired Aerolnfo Systems for an undisclosed amount.
7 Acquisition Horizontal 5-Sep-00 AeroInfo maintenance software The acquisition adds Aerolnfos industry-leading 
aviation
Systems Inc applications for the maintenance planning technology to Boeings portfolio of aviation
airline industry services.
Boeing Co agreed to acquire SVS Inc for an undisclosed amount.
Makes laser tracking SVS Inc is expected to bring to Boeing not only directed energy
8 Acquisition Horizontal 27-Jun-00 SVS Inc and imaging systems but also a wide range of electro-optical controls and imaging
control applications for both the defense and commercial markets.
Boeing acquired Flight Safety Boeing Training International for
FlightSafety . FlightSafety International for an undisclosed amount to expand its
9 Divestiture. Vertical 23-Sep-02 Boeing Provides flight capabilities and customer offerings. FlightSafety Boeing TrainingTraining training International employs 800 people and has 70 full-flight simulators
International in 21 locations throughout the world.
The Boeing Co, a developer and marketer of jet aircraft and
Provides software provider of commercial airline services acquired SBS InternationalPrmodles searew for an undisclosed amount. Based in New York, SBS International
10 Acquisition Horizontal 27-Jul-01 SBS modules used in crew develops software modules used in crew scheduling for airlinesInternational scheduling systems and will complement other recent Boeing acquisitions. This
airlines acquisition allows the leveraging of intellectual capital and
technology as Boeing expands its business.
Aerospace Makes aerospace and Rockwell transferred the majority of its businesses to a new
11 Divestiture Horizontal 1-Aug-96 and Defense mae equspaend company that will keep the Rockwell name, leaving the Aerospace
Business military equipment and Defense businesses acquired by Boeing.
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No Deal Type Purpose Announce Company Products Deal BriefNo Del Tye Pupose Date
Hughes Manufactures Boeing acquired Hughes satellite business from General Motors
Satellite satellite and for $3.8 billion in cash to solidify its position as the leader in12 Divestiture Horizontal 13-Jan-00 Systems communications integrated space-based information and communications. The
Business systems acquisition will boost Boeings space and communications
revenues and earnings by more than a third.
Aerolnfo provides
computerized
maintenance services
Aerolnfo through software it13 5-Sep-00 Systems Inc. developed to plan,
schedule and track
aircraft maintenance
requirements over the
Internet.
Develops software
Acquisitio Preston technology for air
14 Acquisition n of non- 28-Sep-99 Group Pty traffic management The Boeing Co acquired The Preston Group for an undisclosed
US Ltd (The) and airport terminal amount to expand its portfolo of support products and services.
control
Aero Boeing Co and Czech airline CSA AS are buying a 37% stake in
15 Divestiture Horizontal Vodochody aircraft m uacturer Aero Vodochody AS, a Czech military aircraft manufacturer. The
AS acquisition is as a joint venture with Boeing owning 33.3 percent.
16 Divestiture Vertical 4-Jan-95 Precision Helicopter gears & Boeing Co acquired Precision Gear Unit through Litton IndustriesGear transmissions Inc.
Source: Thompson Financials
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APPENDIX B
Mergers and Acquisitions of Boeing since 1996 (Selling)
# Deal Type Announce Company Products Company Products Deal Brief
Date
Sold Companies Acquirer
I Divestiture 25-Feb-98 Commercial Manufactures Textron Inc Makes gas
Helicopter helicopters turbine engines
Business
2 Divestiture 17-Apr-03 Aerospace Primary Metal Snecma Manufactures Labinal SA, a unit of Snecma, agreed to acquire
Wiring Processing propulsion and the aerospace wiring corporations of Boeing Co
Operations In harnesses for aerospace which is located in Corinth, Texas for an
Corinth commercial equipment undisclosed amount. Included in the transaction
jetliners and is a wiring harness supply facility with its 900
military aircraft employees.
3 Divestiture 24-Jan-02 Thermal Manufactures GKN PLC Manufactures
Joining Centre titanium assemblies automotive and
for the F22 Raptor off-highway GKN PLC acquired the Thermal Joining Centre
aircraft vehicle from The Boeing Co for $4.8 million
4 Divestiture 11-Jun-99 Boeing Provides the Science Provides systems Information Services division to Science
Information federal government Application integration and
Services with information s information Applications International for an undisclosed
and systems Internationa technology amount. The sale is part of Boeings strategic
integration services 1 Corp services plan of focusing on core businesses.
5 Divestiture 19-Oct-00 Military Plane Manufactures plane GKN PLC Manufactures GKN acquired the military plane structures
Structures parts automotive and operations of The Boeing Co for $61 million.
Operations of off-highway The acquisition will almost double GKN
The Boeing vehicle parts as aerospace sales. GKN intends to transfer
Co well as aerospace additional manufacturing and new technology
and defense into St Louis, which will become a core facility
products for GKN Aerospace and its administrative
headquarters in the USA.
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# Deal Type Announce Company Products Company Products Deal Brief
Date
6 Divestiture 25-Nov-02 Spokane Manufactures Triumph Designs, Triumph Group Inc acquired the assets of theFabrication aircraft parts Group Inc engineers, Spokane fabrication operation of the Boeing Co.Operation of manufactures, This acquisition will expand the product andThe Boeing repairs, customer service offerings of Triumph GroupCo overhauls, and Inc. The Spokane Fabrication Operation of the
distributes Boeing Co employs approximately 400 people.
______________ ~~~~~~~~aircraft parts BoigCemlyaprxaty40pol.
7 Divestiture 18-Mar-02 Ordnance Manufactures Alliant Develops and Alliant Techsystems acquired the ordinance
business of medium-caliber Techsystem supplies business of the Boeing Co for an undisclosed
Boeing Co automatic cannons aerospace and amount. The ordinance business has about 50
and machine guns defense employees and is based in Mesa, Arizona.
technologies, Alliant Techsystems will operate the ordnance
products, and business in Mesa and will assume ownership of
systems the facilities and other assets associated with the
company.
8 Divestiture 3-Aug-01 Sensors And Provides advanced DRS Supplies
Electronic electro-optical electronic
Systems airborne and naval systems and DRS Technologies acquired the assets and
Business of surveillance and products for the certain liabilities of Sensors and Electronic
Boeing Co targeting systems, defense industry Systems Business of The Boeing Co for $67
high-performance million in cash. This acquisition increases the
military infrared annual sales of DRS Technologies by about 50
cooled sensor percent, adding around $75 million to annual
systems, and sales.
infrared uncooled
sensor systems
9 Unit 17-Jan-01 HRL Provides General Manufactures General Motors acquired a one-third equity
Minority. Laboratories government Motors automobiles and stake in HRL Laboratories from Boeing and
Divestiture LLC research and Corp trucks and Raytheon for an undisclosed price. As a result of
development provides the acquisition, GM, Boeing and Raytheon will
programs and financing share equal ownership of HRL Laboratories,
provides research services with HRL providing corporate research and
and development development for all three companies. The
services acquisition enhances the technical capabilities in
several areas of critical importance to GM, while
also allowing HRL another corporate owner,
further providing for global alliances and
_ 004W
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# Deal Type Announce Company Products Company Products Deal Brief
Date
partnerships.
I Divestiture 26-Feb-99 McDonnell Provides contract Private Investment group A private group led by management and CIVC
0 Unit Douglas engineering, Group Led led by arte gcqupred ByeingMennd CIgC
Manageme Technical technical, and By management and artners acquired Boeings McDonnell Douglas
nt Services Co information Managemen CIVC Partners Technmcal Se rices irt of aoeings effrt to
technology staffing t and CIVC concentrate on its core businesses.
___________services Partners
1 Divestiture 3-Nov-99 Aces Ii Makes ejection Goodrich Makes a range of B.F. Goodrich acquired the ACES II
I seats for the U.S. (BF) Co aerospace ejection seat business from Boeing for an
Air Force and systems and undisclosed amount. ACES II is now part of
international component parts, B.F. Goodrich Aerospace Safety Systems
defense customers and provides division. With this acquisition, B.F. Goodrich
maintenance for expands its product lines and existing ejection
those systems seat business.
1 Divestiture 22-Oct-99 Boeing Assembles, tests, Derlan Makes aerospace Derlan Industries acquired Boeing Precision
2 Precision Gear and maintains drive Industries and specialty Gear unit for $10.2 million in cash. The deal issystems Ltd products part of Boeings' plan to focus on its core
business.
1 Divestiture 1-Oct-00 Structural Fabricated Metal Gkn Plc Manufacturing GKN Plc, Redditch, Worcestershire, England,
3 Fabrication Products Not automotive drive the engineering and industrial components
Operations of Elsewhere line systems and company, acquired the structural fabrication
Boeing Classified engineered and operations based in St Louis, Missouri, USA, of
Company agritechnical The Boeing Company, Seattle, Washington,
products. USA, the aerospace company. Consideration
US$61m (GB44m).
1 Divestiture 23-Jan-92 de Havilland Manufactures Bombardier Manufactures
4 Unit airplanes Inc transportation Purchasing in conjunction with the Ontario
equipment provincial government
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# Deal Type Announce Company Products Company Products Deal Brief
Date
1 Divestiture 7-Jul-99 Radar- Makes devices that Condor Provides Boeing agreed to sell its Radar-Jamming Device5 Jamming analyze, intercept Technology information Unit to Condor Systems for an undisclosedDevice Unit and jam radar and Solutions technology amount. The sale is part of its strategy to trim its
military Inc services exposure to the defense industry, as spending in
communication this area has been flat.
signals
1 DIVESTIT 30-Sep-96 Boeing Makes cargo LucasVarity Designs, makes
6 URE Georgia Inc handling systems PLC and supplies The acquisition of Boeing in Georgia buy
and related advanced LucasVarity is in line with strategy to strengthen
components for technology position in the aerospace industry.
aircrafts systems, products
and services
Source: Thompson Financials
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APPENDIX C
Interview Questions
The Role of Lean Enterprise Initiatives in Mergers and Acquisitions
1. Introduction and Obiectives
1.1 Introduction
I am a graduate student in the system design and management program at MIT. I
am from Korea and I have three years experience in a chemical company, about
strategy planning, operations, and new business development.
I am working on my thesis with Dr. Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, and my work regards
examining mergers and acquisitions involving the Boeing company, and the
possible impacts of the lean enterprise concept in those mergers.
1.2 Interview Objective
What I am looking for in my thesis is how the mergers and acquisitions of Boeing
are related with lean enterprise efforts in your company, with a specific focus on
enablers and barriers in this process.
1.3 Ethical issues
(1) Confidentiality: My thesis will be published as a public document. The final
analysis will be open to others. If you want keep specific information confidential, I
will abide by that decision. I will also send you a draft of the write-up in advance of
submitting my thesis.
(2) Anonymous Quotes: If you don't want your name used in my thesis, I will
disguise your identity. For example, "An experienced manager in a department
noted...".
2. Research Questions
2.1 Focus
Over the last several years, Boeing has acquired a number of big companies, such
as Rockwell aerospace (1996), McDonnell Douglas (1997), and Hughes Space and
Communications (2000). My interest is in these companies and other M&As in the
past 10 years. If you were involved in the work of pre or post merger organization, I
would like to discuss your experience and views.
2.2. Key Question.
How the lean enterprise efforts were helped or hindered as a result of the merger or
acquisition?
2.3. Interviewee's background
(1) Current Position and Duties
(2) Previous Position and Duties, specifically when you were involved in one of the
mergers and acquisitions in the above cases.
2.4. Overall situation
(1) Which mergers and acquisitions were you involved in?
(2) At the time when the mergers and acquisition was being discussed, what was
93
the status of lean enterprise efforts of both companies (Boeing and target
company)? Was there any company wide effort for lean at that time? If not, where
was the focus? (e.g. lean manufacturing)
Brief Lean Concept Introduction: At their most basic level, Lean principles
involve creating value by eliminating non-value added steps, inventories
and other processes while maximizing cash flow and return on investment,
and establishing and maintaining positive stakeholder perspectives.
2.5. Motivations
(1) What was the motivation for the merger/acquisition? Was "lean" a factor?(2) What organizational needs are being met? How do lean principles fit in?
2.6. Motivation from multiple perspectives
(1) What cultural factors affected the merger/acquisition and the experience of
lean?
(2) What political factors affected the merger/acquisition and the experience of
lean?
2.7 Organization and Strategy
(1) How has the structure of Boeing Company or targeted company changed after
the merger and acquisition? How has this affected lean enterprise effort?(2) How has the strategy of managing global suppliers and customers changed?(3) How are people in Boeing and the target company measuring whether the
merger/acquisition is successful. What are the metrics being used? Financial
performance? Employee morale?
2.8. Interaction between mergers/acquisition and lean enterprise efforts
(1) What was the benefit and cost of mergers/acquisitions in implementing lean
principle in Boeing company after mergers/acquisitions?(2) Did these lessons affect the next mergers/acquisitions? How come?(3) What would you recommend for future mergers and acquisitions of Boeing?(4) What elements of the companies have changed since the merger/acquisition?(Product Line/ Supplier Management/ Organization/ Employment/ New product
development effort/ Sales/ Financial)
3. Conclusion
Do you have any additional comments or observations?
What e-mail address may I use to send you a copy of my write-up for your review?
Thank you for your time.
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